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Prior work suggests that competitive repertoires holistically capture firm-level decision 
making, and provide insight into how firms create and capture value.  However, our 
understanding of the causes and consequences of competitive repertoires remains limited. While 
existing evidence suggests environmental forces and managerial backgrounds influence repertoire 
formation, we do not know how the developmental and competitive state of the industry shapes 
the salience of prior knowledge.  Nor do we understand how the state of the industry influences 
the relative payoffs of particular repertoire configurations.  To further our understanding, I 
investigate the distribution of industry tenure within executive teams, and examine whether the 
industry life cycle influences how prior experience translates into complex and / or consistent 
competitive repertoires. Digging deeper into the implications of the life cycle, I also consider how 
these different facets of the competitive repertoire influence performance under different levels of 
competitive pressure.  I test the model in a longitudinal sample of 3D printer manufacturers in 
operation from 1988 – 2015.  I use this industry to test these effects because a large proportion of 
firms can be tracked, firms exhibit a variety of competitive actions, the level of competitor 
activity varies over time, and firms contain a mix of veteran managers from core industries and 
new managers from outside the industries that “spawned” 3D printing ventures.  I find evidence 
to suggest that while executive experience distributions are very salient for repertoire formation 
early in the life cycle, these effects wane as the industry matures.  Further, the data suggests that 
significant relationships exist between repertoire characteristics and performance, but the pattern 
is nuanced and depends to some degree on the level of competitive pressure.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation 
At its core, strategy is the study of a set of organizational choices taken in the pursuit of 
superior competitive outcomes.  Simon (1947: xlvi) stated that, “decision making is the heart of 
administration [and] must be derived from the logic and psychology of human choice”.  
Essentially, to understand firm decision making patterns, we must understand the decision 
makers.  Relatedly, patterns in firm choices, or competitive action repertoires, shed light on how 
firms accrue economic rents.  As Schoemaker (1990: 1184) notes, “strategy is the means via 
which economic rent is earned, either by exploiting existing imperfections or by creating suitable 
levels of uncertainty and complexity”, where strategy is an interlocking pattern of decisions. 
In line with these sentiments, decision-level theorizing can help to explain how managerial 
characteristics influence decision processes, resultant firm actions, and firm performance 
(Gavetti, Levinthal & Ocasio, 2007: 525).  By decision-level theory building, I mean that 
managerial and firm characteristics should be tied to the likelihood of making a particular set of 
decisions, and that the resultant actions and their aggregations are a meaningful window into 
firm performance.  I claim that the locus of firm behavior and its consequences is situated at the 
decision level – since decisions and their consequent actions are the most fundamental measure 
of purposeful activity that entities exhibit (Parsons, 1937; von Mises, 1949).  And yet, while a 
decision-level focus sheds light on how firm behavior is influenced by managerial antecedents, 
and how firms generate rents through discrete actions, a practical question emerges.  How can 
managerial characteristics be tied to discrete actions?  Relatedly, how can a single decision be 
meaningfully linked to aggregate consequences?  It would be difficult, if not impossible, to link 
single actions taken by a firm to a body of prior activity or managerial traits.   
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In response to these questions, scholars have invoked the competitive repertoire construct as 
a conceptual framework to link a group of actions to managerial characteristics and performance 
(Miller & Chen, 1996). A competitive repertoire is “the set of market actions used by an 
organization during a given year to attract, serve, and keep customers, [which is] composed of 
concrete market decisions such as price changes, product line or service alterations, and changes 
in the scope of operations” (Miller & Chen, 1996: 420).  So conceived, a competitive repertoire 
is an observable artifact that records decisions made by the firm for a certain period of time.  
Using this and similar concepts such as the competitive attack, prior researchers have 
demonstrated the repertoire’s predictive validity as it relates to performance (Ferrier, 2001; 
Andrevski et al., 2014) and that the repertoire’s composition is driven by managerial, firm, and 
environmental factors (e.g., Chen & Miller, 2012; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011).  
The notion of competitive repertoires also equates decisions made by a firm to observable 
actions taken in product and factor markets – with all the attendant performance implications.  
Specifically, competitive actions generate temporary rents by capitalizing on resource or 
opportunity differentials in economic and social systems (D'Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; 
Winter, 1995). Extant theorizing has largely focused on the argument that firm actions mitigate 
diverse organizational and environmental forces that are detrimental to performance, such as the 
competitive reactions of other firms (Chen & Miller, 1994; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 
2008; Young et al., 1996).  Taken together, the competitive repertoire construct provides a means 
to study aggregate firm behavior patterns, and provides a bridge between firm characteristics, 
decisions, and performance.   
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Unanswered questions 
While prior work in the upper echelons literature (e.g., Wowak, Mannor, Arrfelt, & 
McNamara, 2016), and studies specific to competitive actions have begun to shed light on the 
influence of managers on the overall pattern of firm behavior (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick, 
Cho, & Chen, 1996), existing studies have yet to articulate the constraints and tradeoffs 
associated with the pattern of managerial experience across different industries.  A detailed 
investigation of these tradeoffs is important to undertake because there are conflicting views 
regarding the value of industry experience on firm behavior and performance when viewed both 
as a stock (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009) as well as a type of diversity (Harrison & 
Klein, 2007).  Moreover, prior work has not fully considered how salient and pervasive 
contextual factors such as the industry life cycle determines what experiences managers accrue 
or the payoffs to the actions that managers select (Chen & Miller, 2012).   
Moreover, while existing competitive dynamics research provides a link between firm 
actions and performance, it has yet to conceptually separate or empirically test the extent to 
which observed performance effects are due to firm-centric value creation, or from mitigating 
environmental conditions that hamper value capture.  This distinction is relevant because it is 
currently unclear whether repertoires result in superior performance due to synergies between 
different actions undertaken by firms, whether repertoire configurations stymie competitor 
imitation, or a combination of the two.  In both cases, by not incorporating the influence of the 
industrial and competitive context when theorizing about repertoires, the construct’s potential to 
explain how managerial experience translates to performance remains untapped. 
Conceptual and tested model 
To address these unresolved questions, I investigate the critical role of managerial experience 
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on the composition and consequences of competitive repertoires (see Figure 1). Specifically, I 
consider the distribution of within and outside industry tenure inside the management team, and 
how this reservoir of experience shapes the firm’s repertoire of actions.  Tenure within and 
outside the industry are key upper-echelons characteristics to consider because the prior 
experiences conferred by tenure shape the beliefs, social context, and knowledge structures that 
affect individual and group decision making (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009).  Beyond 
examining the direct effect of tenure distributions, I also consider how these effects are 
conditioned by the industry life cycle.  Understanding the influence of the industry life cycle on 
these tenure to repertoire relationships is essential for two reasons: the life cycle shapes the 
experiences that managers accrue during their tenure, and molds the competitive context in 
which they must apply their knowledge and judgment.   
When examining how repertoires are shaped by managerial tenure, I conceptualize the 
competitive repertoire as a vector that captures all observable actions taken over the course of a 
year which is situated within a space of possible actions (Lamberg, Tikkanen, Nokelainen, & 
Suur-Inkeroinen, 2009).  This form provides a compact representation of the firm’s realized 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1978).  While this form is not readily amenable to empirical analysis, I 
consider two key summary statistics, or facets, of this vector: its complexity (Connelly et al., 
2016) and consistency over time (Lamberg et al., 2009).  The facets are considered in concert 
because the first captures the firm’s flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances and generate 
uncertainty to keep competitors off balance (Ferrier, 2001), while the second illuminates the 
stability of the repertoire trajectory over time. Together, they provide a holistic summary of the 
firm’s pattern of action and partially capture the tradeoff between specialization and flexibility. 
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I then examine how these two facets of the competitive repertoire influence firm 
performance, and explicitly test how these effects are modulated by the intensity of competitor 
activity (Derfus et al., 2008) – a key distinguishing characteristic of different life cycle stages. In 
so doing, I attempt to separate the arguments regarding value creation and capture in the 
conceptual development, and empirically test to what extent these effects depend on allaying the 
effects of competitive pressure. Taken together, the model seeks to better understand the causes 
and consequences of the repertoire in an evolving industry. 
I test this model and its associated hypotheses using a data set from a longitudinal sample of 
3D printer manufacturers in operation from 1988 - 2015.  This sample is appropriate for 
analyzing these research questions for several reasons.  First, I can observe a wide variety of 
managerial backgrounds since new firms are started through spin-outs, firm dissolutions, and as 
new managers and owners enter the industry because the underlying technological bases of the 
industry continue to shift (Wohler’s Report, 2013). I am also able to track a near census of firms 
within the industry from the beginning of the sample frame to the present, enabling me to capture 
changes in life cycle stage and partially account for selection effects.  
Moreover, the size and complexity of the market as well as the number of competitors vary 
over time.  This allows me to capture a variety of competitive actions and differing levels of 
competitive pressure over time.  In comparison to very new and very established industries, the 
potential range of competitive repertoires is such that established recipes for acting have not yet 
fully disseminated, while the industry is also not so new where firms are still struggling to 
establish access to basic resources.  Firms continue to assess their place within the industry vis-à-
vis other players, and determine what competitive moves are best suited to capture customers 
(D’Aveni, 1994).  Finally, given the disruptive nature of this industry, a more in-depth 
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understanding of its competitive dynamics is warranted. 
Summary of findings 
I find broad support for the assertion that TMT prior industry experience is related to 
increased levels of repertoire consistency.  Contrary to my predictions, outside experiences are 
associated with more complex repertoires in early life cycle stages, but this relationship weakens 
over time instead of becoming stronger.  Digging deeper into this effect, I examined the relative 
balance between inside and outside industry experience and uncovered that firms in the sample 
seem to be converging towards a common level of complexity and consistency, regardless of 
their particular distribution of experience in the management team.  This seems to suggest that 
firms have access to alternative means of achieving similar repertoire profiles, in spite of 
different management team compositions. 
As it relates to my hypotheses regarding the effect of competitive repertoires on firm 
performance, several specifications indicate that there is a positive main effect between 
repertoire complexity, consistent with the existing literature.  However, this effect was not robust 
to unobserved firm fixed effects, which may indicate that some other latent quality of the firms 
may be the underlying driver of this effect.  Furthermore, there is some, but inconclusive, 
evidence to suggest that complexity is more pivotal in competitive environments. By contrast, 
the predictions regarding the curvilinear relationship between repertoire consistency and 
performance were largely unsupported at typical levels of competitive pressure.  In fact, in the 
case of market share the relationship may be U-shaped, rather than the hypothesized inverted U 
relationship.  However, the data suggest that the second order effect of repertoire consistency on 
performance may be moderated by competitive pressure, but the results are also not conclusive. 
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CHAPTER 2 – COMPETITIVE REPERTOIRES: A LITERATURE REVIEW  
The competitive repertoire as a lens 
Several authors have identified the promise of competitive repertoires as a way to understand 
the overall pattern of firm actions over time, and their performance consequences in competitive 
settings (e.g., Lamberg et al., 2009; Miller & Chen, 1996a).  A competitive repertoire is defined 
as “the set of market actions used by an organization during a given year to attract, serve, and 
keep customers, [which is] composed of concrete market decisions such as price changes, 
product line or service alterations, and changes in the scope of operations” (Miller & Chen, 
1996: 420) and “is made up of the entire range of the firm’s competitive moves” (see Chen & 
Miller, 2012: 145).  So conceived, competitive repertoires are an observable artifact that records 
the decisions made by the firm for a certain period of time, including those actions that are 
responses to competitive activity. 
In line with Mintzberg's (1973) conceptualization of strategy as a pattern of action and Chen 
and Miller’s (2012: 138) notion of thematic consistency, aggregating a set of actions that a firm 
takes for a specific period of time allows researchers to distill a general pattern of activity and 
deduce the overall aggressiveness, non-conformity, and strategic direction of an organization.  
Consistent with logic of revealed preference (Varian, 2006), patterns of action allow researchers 
to more closely examine regularities in decision making, and describe the behavior of the firm 
more accurately than isolating particular activities or routines (Pentland & Rueter, 1994).   
Moreover, examining collections of actions and the aggregate level of competitive response 
can provide a lens to view how the performance effects of firm decisions are influenced by 
market processes.  One can envision how differences in focal and competitor action propensity 
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can influence the stream of Schumpeterian rents accruing to firms possessing valuable but 
imitable information, affect the ability to capitalize on composite quasi-rents for firms that have 
made transaction-specific investments, or modify the demand for required resources, increasing 
factor prices at the margin (Keyhani, Levesque, & Madhok, 2015; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
Beyond the conceptual insights that repertoires of action can provide, many dimensions relevant 
to individual actions can also be considered without loss of generality at the aggregate level.  
This serves to increase the observed effect size, making signals in noisy data easier to detect. As 
such, the concept of competitive repertories holds more explanatory power than individual 
actions when predicting firm outcomes – and affords conceptual tools that are not available when 
studying actions individually.   
I conceptualize the competitive repertoire, building on Lamberg et al.’s (2009) work, as a 
vector that captures all observable actions taken over the course of a year that are situated within 
a space of possible actions.  When the competitive repertoire is conceptualized in this manner, 
the repertoire provides a link between firm decisions (which are manifest in observable actions) 
and the implications of those decisions within a competitive environment. In particular, Lamberg 
and colleagues (2009) provide a critical insight into understanding how the actual actions 
undertaken by the firm can be mapped onto the performance landscapes described by those 
authors using NK modeling studies (e.g., Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008; Levinthal, 1997).  In 
their paper, the authors conceptualize a firm’s repertoire as a vector of actions within an 
underlying decision space, which they project into two dimensions using a principal component 
analysis (Lamberg et al., 2009: 54).  This conceptualization allows for empirically observed 
actions to be associated with observed performance levels, providing all of the necessary 
coordinates for mapping action – performance configurations within a given environment of 
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decision.  While the overall shape of the decision space and the performance landscape cannot be 
imputed from these isolated points, this conceptualization allows the results the simulation 
studies examining these performance landscapes to be drawn upon and applied.  
Facets of the competitive repertoire  
While the vector representation of the competitive repertoire is not readily amenable to 
empirical analysis, I consider three key summary statistics, or facets, of this vector: the total 
number of actions taken by the firm in a given year (known as volume, see Young, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1996), the stability of the repertoire’s position within a space of possible actions over 
time (termed consistency, see Lamberg et al., 2009), and the variety and relative proportion of 
different action types performed by the firm in that same period of time (defined as complexity, 
see e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Miller & Chen, 1996). I argue that these three facets provide a 
comprehensive summary of the different structural aspects of the competitive repertoire, 
shedding light on the firm's potential to undertake meaningful action and generate rents, match 
actions to environmental contingencies, and balance the competing pressures of specialization 
and flexibility. Beyond the aspects studied here, a repertoire can also be assessed by the 
characteristics of the actions from which it is comprised – in other words by considering the 
typical level of significance, noteworthiness and scope (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996), reaction 
difficulty (Chen & Miller, 1994) or irreversibility (Chen and MacMillan, 1992).  The component 
aspects of the repertoire can be classified via a number of dimensions, such as entrepreneurial, 
Ricardian, deterrent, and cooperative actions (Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006; Vannoy & Salam, 
2010).  However, this information takes into consideration aspects of action content – whereas 
the three facets considered take into consideration structural factors that should be equally 
relevant across different industry and environmental settings. I provide a summary of prior work 
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related to these repertoire facets below. 
Volume: By volume, I refer to the total number of actions taken by a firm in a given year 
(Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999).  The primary drivers of this construct are the number of 
events that a firm can respond to (quantity of stimuli) and the propensity to act when presented 
with the opportunity (likelihood of action, see Nokelainen, 2008).  Volume is typically 
conceptualized as a simple measure of total competitive activity (Andrevski et al., 2007; Derfus 
et al., 2008; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Young et al., 1996; Young et al., 2000; Zhang, 
Song, and Qu, 2011) that a firm undertakes in a given period and is also a component of 
competitive aggressiveness measures (e.g., Andrevski, Richard, Shaw, & Ferrier, 2014).  Young 
and colleagues (1996) articulate the connection of this construct with Schumpeterian rents, 
arguing that since rents are limited in duration, engaging in more competitive activity should 
result in higher levels of performance.  This logic has been relied upon in later competitive 
dynamics studies (e.g., Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier et al., 1999; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996) 
and is one of the most commonly studied repertoire variables.   
Moreover, repertoire volume can also be considered as a measure of repertoire magnitude, or 
the potential degrees of freedom available to firms when undertaking actions.  Said differently, 
the potential for changes in other aspects of the competitive repertoire is bounded by the overall 
magnitude of the repertoire vector.   For instance, the level of consistency (or more accurately, 
the lack thereof) depends upon the distance between the former and current location of the 
repertoire within the space of actions.  As the absolute magnitude of the repertoire vector 
increases, the possible level of these other variables should increase as well for purely arithmetic 
reasons.  Thus, even though total competitive activity is an important construct to consider in its 
own right, it is also a critical control when considering more complicated facets of the repertoire 
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such as complexity or consistency.  This measure of competitive activity can also be aggregated 
across competitors.  This change in level of aggregation and the removal of the focal firm from 
the computation is conceptualized as the level of pressure that competing firms place on a focal 
firm’s ability to capture any rents generated (Young et al., 1996; 2000).   
Complexity. Repertoire complexity is the variety of actions taken by a firm in a given year 
(Ferrier, 2001).  Existing studies have typically conceptualized the complexity of the repertoire 
in this manner (Andrevski, Richard, Shaw, & Ferrier, 2014; Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & 
Derfus, 2006; Larraneta, Zahra, & Gonzalez, 2014; Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005; Smith, Ferrier, 
& Ndofor, 2001; Yeung and Lau, 2005).  Since repertoire complexity is a variable that can only 
be observed at the repertoire level, it provided one of the first justifications for aggregating 
competitive actions in this manner.  As a result, many of the early studies of competitive 
repertoire used several variations of the complexity construct, such as the simplicity, range, 
dominance and concentration of competitive actions (Miller & Chen, 1996a), the non-conformity 
of a target repertoire with respect to a benchmark (Boyd & Bresser, 2004; Miller & Chen, 1996b; 
Norman, Artz, & Martinez, 2007), or the level of competitive inertia within a repertoire (Miller 
& Chen, 1994).  The study of complexity also opened the door for considering the antecedents to 
complexity, such as management team heterogeneity (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996) and 
network characteristics (Chi, Ravichandran, and Andrevski, 2010). 
Synthesizing these different aspects from prior research, the level of complexity is 
determined by the number of actions that a firm can and has taken in a year (requisite variety) 
and the extent to which actions are evenly distributed across different situations (discriminating 
use).  In this study, I conceptualize the complexity of the repertoire as a measure of the firm's 
behavioral entropy (Langlois, 1986: 7) - and confers the firm with the ability to at least partially 
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match the entropy of its environment. Thus, while there are a number of potential measures used 
in the literature to measure complexity and its converse - simplicity (Miller and Chen, 1996a; 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Zhang, Song, & Qu, 2011) - I utilize a Shannon entropy index to capture 
both the range of potential actions as well as the evenness of distribution among these observed 
actions.   
Such a measure captures two relevant aspects of the complexity construct.  First, a higher 
level of behavioral entropy provides insight into the maximum amount of environmental entropy 
that can be accommodated by the firm's existing set of capabilities (Langlois, 1986) - meaning 
that the firm has an appropriate response to a wider number of environmental contingencies.  
This ability to match varied situations with varied responses corresponds to Ashby's (1956) 
principle of requisite variety.  Further, to the extent that increased repertoire complexity serves as 
an insurance policy against environmental changes and contingent events, it also serves to 
frustrate the attempts of competitors to imitate or duplicate the actions of the focal firm (Rivkin, 
2001).  Indeed, as the number of potential choices increases and the behavioral entropy of the 
focal firm increases, it becomes more and more difficult to predict what the best competitive 
response should be, particularly if these selections are made simultaneously.  This is a more 
difficulty task compared to the focal firm's game with the environment, where contingencies can 
sometimes be observed before acting (Shy, 1999).    
Consistency. Repertoire consistency pertains to the stability of the firm’s repertoire trajectory 
over time, such that a similar pattern of actions is taken from one year to the next (Lamberg et 
al., 2009).  A fully consistent repertoire is one whose proportion of action types does not vary 
over time (constant direction), while inconsistent repertoires contain variations in strategic 
direction. Such changes are particularly inconsistent when the proportion of actions taken 
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changes dramatically (magnitude of shift).  Unlike the other two constructs, the construct of 
repertoire consistency is a relatively recent development within the field of competitive 
dynamics, but offers great promise in articulating the change in the final position of the 
repertoire vector in the space of potential actions over time.   
Repertoire consistency opens the door to considering the effect of specialization and learning 
economies, integrating the insights of earlier work on the implications of performance feedback 
on the structure of competitive repertoires (Miller & Chen, 1994).  Consistency also provides a 
window into the ease or difficulty for a firm to grapple with the forces of strategic change - 
particularly in situations where the basis of competition has shifted within an industry.  In this 
regard, the roles of consistency and complexity are complementary - the former providing an 
indication of the firm's trajectory or path within the action space (Sydow et al., 2009; Gruber, 
2010), while the latter provides an indicator of the range of possible discretion and latitude the 
firm has at its disposal as it charts this path forward.   
Competitive repertoires and firm performance 
The notion of competitive repertoires equates decisions made by a firm to observable actions 
taken in product and factor markets – with all the attendant performance implications.  
Specifically, competitive actions generate temporary rents by capitalizing on resource or 
opportunity differentials in economic and social systems (D'Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; 
Winter, 1995).  The following section discusses the conceptual basis for how rents are generated 
and captured through competitive actions, followed by a summary of the empirical evidence to 
date relating competitive repertoire facets to performance outcomes. 
Competition and the market process. There is a critical assumption inherent in most 
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discussions of firm performance.  Namely, it is assumed that if there are no isolating mechanisms 
present (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992), then the competitive market process (Kirzner, 1973) will 
drive prices towards equilibrium values consistent with the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics (Mahoney & Qian, 2013).  Kirzner (1973: 97) perhaps states it best saying, “for us to 
speak freely of a lack of competitiveness in a market process, we must be able to point to 
something which prevents market participants from competing” (emphasis original).  Indeed, the 
implicit underpinning of the fundamental theorem (Debreu, 1959) is that the market process, 
driven by entrepreneurial discovery and action, smooths out informational asymmetries (Kirzner, 
1973) and brings prices into line with the costs of production – eliminating economic profits in 
the long term in the absence of structural impediments (Makowski & Ostroy, 2001).   
Critically, actions aim to exploit the temporary differences between product and factor 
market prices, but the very identification of this discrepancy leads to others discovering the 
existence of these differences at little to no cost (Arrow, 1962), and thus competitors can 
similarly exploit and compete away the arbitrage opportunity (Kirzner, 1973: 85; see also von 
Mises, 1949: 288).  Yet, the restrictions placed upon the abilities of firms and their competitors 
by theories of bounded rationality are of vital importance in explaining the means for generating 
economic profits (i.e., firm capabilities, see Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Gavetti, 2005; 
Schoemaker, 1990), the sustainability of profits (i.e., isolating mechanisms, see Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992; Rivkin, 2000) , as well as the potential for firms to accrue profits (e.g., 
complementarity, see Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2012; Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008).   
In particular, when firms are placed upon a performance landscape that represents the 
complexity of the economic system, and parameterized by the manifold decisions to be made 
(e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; 2001), it becomes clear that the ability of competitors to 
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instantaneously (or perhaps ever) fully match the successful actions of firms may be stymied for 
several reasons.   To be clear, firms are incentivized to replicate the actions of others to the 
extent that their resource bases allow them to, and that the higher performance of certain firms 
can be observed by others.   
First, since the environment is not a nearly decomposable system, there are several unknown 
interactions between the various decisions to be made (Simon, 1962).  These non-linearities have 
been captured using NK-models borrowed from ecology (Kauffman, 1993) and more recently 
through the use of dense adjacency matrices that reflect the interconnections between firm 
decisions (Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008). As discussed by Rivkin (2000: 835), when firms are 
boundedly rational and operating in a decision landscape that exceeds their computational 
abilities, local search is a primary mode of adaptation – and can result in firms having markedly 
different portfolios of actions, particularly if they enter the landscape at different starting points.  
Second, when firms do attempt to replicate the patterns of actions of leading firms, even small 
perturbations in the replication process may result in markedly different performance outcomes 
(Rivkin, 2000: 831), limiting the deleterious effect of imitation even if the firm is able to 
replicate its success internally (Rivkin, 2001).  These and other prior simulation studies provide 
analytical support regarding how behavioral principles such as local search influence the 
behavior of firms and their competitors along a performance landscape.   
Conversely, even though firms may be hamstrung in exactly replicating the repertoire of their 
competitors because they compete in different aspects of the action space or cannot duplicate the 
level of complexity achieved by the focal firm, there are multiple means by which competitors 
are able to successfully meet customer needs and achieve high performance through the use of 
problemistic search to find acceptable substitutes. In turn, the increased success of competitors 
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drives the focal firm to search for new methods to overcome decrements in their own 
performance (Derfus et al., 2008).  Taken together, these two mechanisms are the prime drivers 
of the Red Queen effect, in concert with differential selection (Barnett & Pontikes, 2005).  The 
Red Queen model implies that competitors exert pressure on one another and cause them to “run 
faster and faster to remain in the same place” (Derfus et al., 2008).  Prior research has shown that 
survival rates depend on the ecology of competitors and the recency, variability, and content of 
prior competitive experience, because firms learn lessons from one another about how to 
compete more effectively (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & McKendrick, 2004).  The effect 
of the Red Queen has also been shown at the action level (Derfus et al., 2008), where the 
performance effects of particular actions result in increased competitor activity, which 
subsequently diminishes the efficiency by which focal firm actions translate to increased 
performance. These studies and many others within the structure-conduct-performance (Scherer 
& Ross, 1990), new empirical industrial organization (Martin, 2002), multipoint competition (Yu 
& Cannella, 2013) and sustainable performance (Ghemawat, 1999) paradigms have illustrated 
how competitive interactions result in a diminishment of the link between competitive activity 
and firm performance in the absence of barriers to competitive activity.   
Existing empirical evidence. The majority of research applying the competitive repertoire 
construct is situated within the competitive dynamics literature, which seeks to study “interfirm 
rivalry based on specific competitive actions and reactions, their strategic and organizational 
contexts, and their drivers and consequences” (Chen & Miller, 2012: 137), with an emphasis on 
explaining performance differentials common to studies of competitive strategy.  Early studies 
used competitive repertoire volume as a summary statistic to aggregate actions over a specific 
period of time to observe firm-level performance effects (Ferrier, Smith & Grimm, 1999; Young 
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et al., 1996; Young, Smith, Grimm & Simon, 2000).  This method of discerning the performance 
effect continues to be used, and is it typically captured using a measure of total competitive 
activity or competitive pressure (Andrevski et al., 2014; Basdeo et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2011).   
From this base, later studies examined the effect of repertoires on performance and have 
shown that focal firm competitive activity and speed begets increased performance as measured 
by revenue, profitability or some variation of return on assets (Bridoux, Smith, & Grimm, 2013; 
Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Derfus et al., 2008; Young et al., 1996).  In a comprehensive study of a 
number of different resource management actions, Bridoux and colleagues (2013) sketched out 
the estimated performance boosting effect of different actions over time and found that different 
action types vary in the magnitude and duration of performance benefit. Studies of market share 
change (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Hambrick et al., 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Tsai et al., 2011), 
industry dethronement (Ferrier et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2001), diffusion rate gaps (Zhang et 
al.,2011) and relative perceptual performance (Lin & Shih, 2008) all provide further evidence 
that increased competitive aggressiveness is associated with increased relative performance.   
Empirically, strong effect sizes have also been reported for increased action repertoire 
complexity in its various forms (Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier, 2013; Basdeo et al., 2006; 
Larraneta, Zahra, & Gonzalez, 2014; Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005; Smith et al., 2001) – although 
investigations that consider the potential for reverse causality (i.e. strong performance allows for 
a more robust competitive repertoire) do not appear to have been systematically performed to 
date.  Concordantly, strategic simplicity has been found to have deleterious performance effects 
(Miller & Chen, 1996).  There is evidence of a feedback loop between good performance and 
strategic simplicity, wherein good performance results in increasing competitive repertoire 
simplicity, which begets poorer performance in the future after accounting for the tendency for 
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strong past performance to beget future performance (Miller & Chen, 1996a: 434).  Others have 
started to combine the dimensions of total competitive activity as well as the overall complexity, 
or diversity, of competitive activity into a summary construct of competitive aggressiveness 
(e.g., Offstein and Gnywali, 2005; Yu, Subramaniam, & Cannella, 2009) or competitive intensity 
(Andrevski et al., 2014), while others continue to consider volume, complexity and heterogeneity 
as separate constructs (e.g., Chi et al., 2010).  Similarly, repertoire non-conformity and deviance 
from industry norms typically have positive influences on these same metrics (Ndofor et al., 
2011; Norman et al., 2007).  Taken in concert, there is solid evidence to support the claim that 
competitive repertoires have established links to both relative and absolute performance.   
However, there remains ambiguity in the existing literature regarding to what extent 
temporary and structural rents accrue to firm actions, and to what extent observed effects relate 
to differences in rent generating capabilities versus the ability to capture those rents (for an 
exception, see Derfus et al., 2008).  The theoretical argumentation for why these performance 
effects are observed often depend upon the reactions of competitors, rather than an argument for 
why the activity of the focal firm gives rise to superior performance in the first instance (for 
exceptions, see Chen & Miller, 1994). Thus, our understanding of how competitive repertoires 
drive performance is incomplete.  We only have one theory of firm rents accruing to action – we 
assume that rents will be generated via actions and also assume that they will be competed away 
by competitive activity.  When arguing for why different facets of the competitive portfolio will 
generate rents, prior work tends to not articulate how firms generate these rents, but rather how 
firm activity retards the efficacy of assumed competitive reactions.  I attempt to address this 
limitation of existing work in my performance related hypotheses.  
 
Top Management Team Tenure, Competitive Repertoires, and Firm Performance in the 3D Printing Industry (1988 – 2015)  
19 
Limitations of the repertoire approach 
The repertoire affords a number of conceptual and practical benefits.  To begin, the primary 
strengths of the repertoire approach is that it can show the manifold means by which firms can 
generate rents through actions, and how certain repertoire configurations may mitigate the effects 
of environmental and competitive pressures. This core argument is consistent with the earlier 
insights of Miller and Chen (1994: 7; 1996) who argue that superior performance may be derived 
not only from unexpected actions but from alternative mechanisms such as the influence of 
competitive inertia on firm adaptability. Furthermore, the repertoire provides a parsimonious 
means to aggregate discrete competitive actions, serving as a way to detect patterns in the set of 
actions that firms perform which could be difficult to uncover if individual actions or discrete 
sequences of actions are studied. 
However, the use of repertoires is not without its costs.  In particular, the dimension of time – 
a critical aspect of both competitive dynamics research and strategic management more generally 
– is suppressed when using the repertoire construct.  In order to unlock these dynamics, 
competitive dynamics researchers have used alternative means and measures to examine the back 
and forth dynamics of competitive attacks and retaliations.  In a seminal paper, Ferrier (2001: 
859) discussed the concept of competitive attack, which he defines as “an ordered, uninterrupted 
sequence of repeatable competitive action events.”  This construct sheds light on the process and 
temporal ordering of competitive actions and responses. Rindova and her colleagues (2010) use a 
similar conceptualization and examined the gestalt properties of these sequences such as the 
predictability, grouping, simplicity and motif of the attack.  Similarly, Derfus and associates 
(2008) investigated Red Queen effects related to competitive action and found that as firm 
actions increase, the number and speed of rival actions increase, leading to countervailing effects 
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on performance.   
In order to maintain theoretical parsimony and retain emphasis on the firm-centric decision 
constructs, I have chosen to not use these more time- and sequence- sensitive measures – 
although the argumentation should proceed in largely the same manner.  However, while I do not 
examine the discrete competitive interactions that take place, I do consider the collective weight 
of all competitive responses, or the overall volume or magnitude of competitor activity, on a 
focal firm’s performance in developing my arguments.  The construct of overall competitor 
pressure captures the total amount of competitive activity generated by all other firms within the 
industry, which should influence the duration a focal firm’s rents can be generated before being 
eroded by competitor imitation or substitution (Derfus et al., 2008; Young et al., 1996).   
The antecedents of competitive repertoires 
Repertoires are an artifact of the decision making process, and thus their antecedents are 
typically rooted in explanations of firm and executive decision making.  Prior work in the 
competitive dynamics field indicates that repertoires and the actions that comprise them stem 
from the confluence of three factors: awareness, motivation, and capability (Chen & Miller, 
1994; Chen, 1996).  Each of these elements operate at the level of the top management team as 
well as throughout the lower levels of the organization – in line with a distinction between 
routine and non-routine decision making (Gavetti, 2005).  While a wide body of research exists 
in both areas, I limit my discussion to research that relates management team characteristics to 
competitive actions and repertoires. 
I use the concept of awareness to refer to the organizational and environmental cues that 
prompt a need or desire by the firm and its decision makers to act, and the means for recognizing 
these stimuli.  There are several studies that focus on how firm leaders selectively attend to and 
Top Management Team Tenure, Competitive Repertoires, and Firm Performance in the 3D Printing Industry (1988 – 2015)  
21 
process these cues (e.g., Andrevski et al., 2014; Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick et al., 1996; Offstein, 
Gnyawali, & Cobb, 2005).  In an early study, Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) found that 
increased top management team (TMT) education and tenure heterogeneity were related to 
increased propensity to take actions of high magnitude.  Ferrier (2001) found the heterogeneity 
of the TMT increases competitive attack complexity, which he attributes the group's increased 
field of vision and enriched cognitive map.  These ideas have continued to be drawn upon and 
supported in later papers (Andrevski et al., 2014; Lamberg et al., 2009). More recently, cognitive 
accounts have been put forward to assess how firms may differ in their responsiveness to certain 
stimuli (Marcel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2010), conceptualizing organizational cognition and attention 
patterns using constructs such as competitive tension and acumen (Chen et al., 2007; Tsai, Su & 
Chen, 2011).  For example, competitive acumen - or the extent to which a firm is able to 
replicate the cognitive map of its competitors (for the purpose of predicting potential response), 
is explained by a firm's structural and relational embeddedness (Tsai et al., 2011).  Similarly, 
Vannoy and Salam (2010) provide a process model of competitive action that incorporates 
conceiving, enacting and executing competitive actions, and argue that information systems 
increase the awareness of competitive stimuli.   
Beyond awareness, the firm must also be motivated to expend energy and resources in 
executing firm actions.  Two major perspectives concerning the motivations for competitive 
actions have been discussed in the literature: incentives to pursue or discourage certain firm 
activity (see e.g., Chen et al., 1992) and the varied motivations of stakeholders that shape the 
objectives and goal hierarchy of the firm (e.g., Connelly et al., 2010).  Given my emphasis on 
managerial influences, I limit my discussion to the latter.  Specifically, prior work has shown that 
key stakeholders such as the management team have a substantial influence on the amount and 
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type of actions selected.  For example, Offstein and Gnywali (2005) found that CEOs who have 
larger incentive packages engage in more competitive activity, while Connolly and colleagues 
(2010) found that dedicated institutional fund ownership is positively related to strategic actions, 
whereas transient ownership is positively associated with tactical actions and negatively 
associated with strategic actions.  Similarly, Karagozoglu and Fuller (2011) demonstrated that 
the salience of core stakeholders shapes the relationship between prior performance and the 
propensity to engage in strategic actions, while Halbelian and associates (2012) found that the 
firm's overall diversification may allow the corporate office to act a shield between shareholders 
and business units making acquisitions.   
Lastly, firm capabilities are the firm and action specific resources and routines necessary to 
successfully enact intentions to act. Once decision makers have identified an opportunity for 
action, they must generate sufficient consensus and mobilize the necessary internal resources. 
Several prior studies in the upper echelons and behavioral theory of the firm have considered the 
processes and resources that the TMT has at its disposal to initiate a competitive action.  Smith 
and colleagues (1991) considered the role of education and prior experience on the propensity to 
respond to rival actions as well as the type of response selected.  Hambrick and associates (1996) 
argued that heterogeneity increases the creative capacity of the management team and facilitates 
more deliberation and thought exchange, albeit with an increased level of conflict.  Lin and Shih 
(2008) demonstrated that TMT social integration was related to action aggressiveness, as a result 
of increased team flexibility and imagination that stems from social cohesiveness.  Finally, in 
their investigation of strategic consistency over time, Lamberg and colleagues (2009) posited 
that a resourceful and focused administrative body is more apt to achieve strategic consistency. 
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The case for this study 
Even though prior work has established that both managerial traits and environmental factors 
have a role to play in shaping the pattern of firm activity, we still do not have a detailed 
understanding of how the distribution of prior experience within the management team shapes 
the awareness, motivation, or capabilities of top managers to engage in complex or consistent 
repertoires (for an initial step towards that end, see Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996).  Further, 
while the combination of managerial background and industry-level factors has been studied to 
some degree in the competitive dynamics literature (e.g., Nadkarni, Chen, & Chen, 2015) two 
salient contextual conditions that have not been considered in detail (in spite of their central role 
in explaining industry growth and change) are the life cycle (Gort & Klepper, 1982) and the level 
of competitive activity (e.g., Young et al., 1996).   
Both of these factors are expected to have systemic implications for how managerial 
experience is converted into patterns of firm activity, and how firm activity will translate to 
performance.  In the first case, the industry life cycle likely modifies the available stock of 
managerial knowledge and the extent to which those stocks are utilized.  In the second case, 
while prior research has hinted that competitive pressure is a key boundary condition for the 
influence of competitive repertoire configurations on performance, this assertion has not fully 
tested but for Derfus and colleagues’ (2008) study. Thus, a model that considers these elements 
offers a window into these heretofore missed opportunities to examine how industry participants, 
available knowledge, competitive pressure, and firm action patterns evolve over time. Figure 1 
provides a summary of the hypothesized model to which I now turn. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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CHAPTER 3 – HYPOTHESES  
As a collective of individuals with considerable decision rights and access to a wide range of 
relevant information, top managers are particularly influential for firm decision making 
processes since they “structure decision situations to fit their view of the world” (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990: 484).  In line with prior work in the upper echelons tradition, I argue that top 
management teams are a key input to the non-routine decision making processes that are central 
to the execution of novel competitive actions.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I 
conceptually define the top management team as the dominant coalition drawn from the two 
highest executive levels within the organization (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009: 127), 
since their position confers them with general responsibility for firm functioning. 
Both the upper echelons and strategic cognition literatures indicate that the decision making 
process generating observed firm actions is constrained by the mental models and knowledge 
structures of the management team (Walsh, 1995), which themselves may be constrained by the 
firm’s dominant logics (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and available social technology (Stinchcombe, 
1965). As Walsh and Ungson (1991: 69) noted, “Schemata are formed from past experience to 
facilitate information processing in information-rich decision environments”. Executives’ prior 
experiences thus serve as a perceptual filter for understanding subsequent stimuli (Dearborn & 
Simon, 1958; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and provide a schema or frame for understanding 
means-end relationships and anticipating changes (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; Simon, 1996; 
Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  Moreover, managerial reference points regarding losses and gains 
(Lant, 1992; March & Shapira, 1992; Miller & Chen, 2004) as well as expectations (i.e., the first 
and second moments for uncertain outcomes) regarding future performance may also be sensitive 
to prior experience.  For example, recent research has indicated that accurate evaluations of 
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competitive behaviors depends upon the ability for decision makers to “step into the shoes” of 
their rivals - which could be driven by access to contemporaneous information (Tsai, Su, & 
Chen, 2011) or could be informed by similar histories.  Moreover, prior experiences appear to 
shape cognitions regarding causal logics and focus attention on different sectors of the 
environment of decision (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  Cognitive frameworks also affect the speed 
and likelihood of challenging the actions of adversaries (Marcel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2010: 129). 
Thus, managerial prior experience has several points of contact with strategic decision 
making processes, making their potential impact critical to uncover. To capture this decisive role 
of prior managerial experience on competitive actions, I consider a particularly salient type of 
managerial experience – experiences within and outside the focal industry.  These different 
experiences collectively capture knowledge within two relevant domains of expertise: knowledge 
related to industry formulae and anticipated outcomes in a given context (total and average focal 
industry experience), and more general knowledge pertaining to executing different competitive 
maneuvers (outside experiences and tenure heterogeneity).   
Experience, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is “practical knowledge, skill[s], or practice 
derived from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular activity.”  Bringing 
this concept into context, prior experience in any industry may provide managers with a reservoir 
of situated knowledge of customer needs, key industry success factors, potential suppliers, and 
regulatory conditions (Feeser & Willard, 1990; Kor, 2003).  Further, experience can “serve to 
shape values and beliefs” as well as cognitive models of reality (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009: 83).  In new venture settings where relevant experience is at a premium, the 
amount and closeness of prior industry experience to current activities has been shown to 
enhance the growth rates and survival chances of firms across a number of industries (Bruderl et 
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al., 1992; Colombo & Grilli, 2005; Klepper 2002; Roberts, Klepper, & Hayward, 2011).  This is 
because such experiences allow managers to have causal interactions with their environment of 
decision (Barnard, 1938), providing private knowledge about what does and does not work 
(Hayek, 1945).  This personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1962) accrues to managers working in any 
industry and provide a set of data unique to each manager’s personal trajectory. 
The shaping role of managerial tenure  
 Tenure within the industry provides a source of valuable, direct experience that enables 
managers to engage in learning by doing, and confers access to contextual task knowledge in 
multiple domains. In particular, tenure confers grounded insights regarding competitors, 
potential customers, and available suppliers (Delmar & Shane, 2006; Feeser & Willard, 1990; 
Kor, 2003; Roberts, Klepper, & Hayward, 2011).  Moreover, prior experience allows managers 
to develop tacit knowledge and expertise (Reuber & Fischer, 1994) as well as awareness and 
access to stores of explicit knowledge, such as industry databases or associations.  Similarly, 
industry experience that flows from tenure also confers access to vicarious learning through the 
formation of ties to industry participants (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997) and increased access 
to social capital (Hsu, 2007).  Further, through the creation of cognitive knowledge structures 
(Fern, Cardinal, & O’Neill, 2012; Walsh, 1995), managers are more in tune and aware of 
potential opportunities within their space for rent generating opportunities and how to capture 
value (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008), and importantly the specific actions (i.e., 
means-ends relationships) to accomplish these goals.  
 However, while the foregoing provides a number of reasons why tenure increases the stock 
of available knowledge available to the focal manager, there are a number of influences that 
bound and limit the information garnered through these direct and indirect channels.  
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Importantly, these influences become more prominent at higher levels of tenure.  To begin, 
experience within a focal industry provides access to a group of individuals and institutions that 
possess industry recipes or other norms that are shared among industry participants (Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, & Frederickson, 1993; Spender, 1989). Some scholars define industries as “shared 
or interlocking metaphors or worldviews” (Huff, 1982: 185).  As tenure increases and managers 
accumulate a large volume of industry relevant knowledge, their knowledge structures become 
more refined and more tightly align to their repeated prior experience (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998).  Evidence suggests that a higher proportion of the learning by 
managers occurs during the early years of their industry tenure, meaning that learning in this 
early stage will have an outsized influence on the knowledge structures constructed (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991).  Further, with increased tenure also comes greater managerial power (Miller, 
1991; van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015), increasing the incentive to maintain the course and 
not introduce disruptive changes.  Thus, as tenure increases, information is more tightly 
processed and filtered through the selective attention to outside sources of information and 
highly refined knowledge structures.  Collectively, these mechanisms result in an increased 
commitment to the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Frederickson, 1993). 
 Taken together, the above evidence suggests that as tenure increases from low levels, 
individual managers will have access to a stock of relevant information that will point them 
towards a specific subset of actions (Fern, Cardinal, & O’Neill, 2012).  This increased awareness 
of particular courses of actions will channel their attention to known alternatives over more 
experimental or unproven courses.  Furthermore, as tenure levels continue to increase, the effects 
of status quo biases and restricted information flow will increasingly inhibit individual managers 
from deviating from established industry recipes (Spender, 1989). 
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 These tendencies are further reinforced as the average level of tenure increases for all 
members of the management team.  Team members tend to focus on common rather than unique 
knowledge when discussing potential alternatives (Mohammed and Dumville, 2011; Nemeth & 
Rogers, 1996) and homogenous teams are subject to groupthink (Janis, 1972) and similar biases 
such as status quo maintenance and cognitive simplification (e.g., Schwenk, 1984).  Furthermore, 
when more individuals within the team are exposed to the same industry, they rely upon the 
same dominant logics (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and draw from similar networks of informants, 
further restricting information flow and the likelihood of exploring alternative options.  
 This common worldview and knowledge set will result in the team converging towards a 
common and unchanging set of actions – as Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) demonstrated in the case 
of Kodak.  While the particular set of activities that the team converges to may be different (e.g., 
teams with high levels of experience in early life cycle stages may conform to practices from 
their experiences in related industries such as inkjet printing, while in later stages firms may 
converge to the emergent body of “best practices”), several mechanisms point towards tenure 
increasing the firm’s level of strategic consistency.  While the counterargument can be made that 
the increased knowledge from tenure may provide the team with a deeper understanding of 
industry trends and awareness of opportunities, the counteracting effect of shared cognitions and 
an increased individual commitment to the status quo are expected to overpower these effects.   
Hypothesis 1: The higher the team’s average industry tenure in the focal or highly 
related industries, the more consistent the firm’s competitive repertoire will be from 
one year to the next. 
 The above arguments apply for all industries, not just the focal industry under consideration.  
This implies that a similar effect is anticipated for tenure gained by managers within any industry 
that they have prior experience.  Importantly, the contextual knowledge gathered in non-related 
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industries will almost surely differ in material ways from that garnered in the focal industry 
(Beckman, 2006; Fern, Cardinal, & O’Neill, 2012), and the likelihood that information networks 
are overlapping decreases (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).   Thus, exposure to other industries 
provides a wider range of insights to be considered and weighed by the team.  Indeed, these 
outside perspectives are often valued, as shown by the hiring of executive team members from 
other industries to help invigorate discussions.  For instance, the trading of executives back and 
forth from LMVH and Apple (in 2014, Apple hired the VP of sales for Tag Heuer, and in 2015 
LMVH hired the chief digital officer from Apple) illustrates how knowledge from different 
industries can be highly valued, particularly when looking to shift strategic direction (in the case 
of Apple, making the iWatch, and in the case of LMVH, to build its online businesses). 
 Therefore, a critical question arises: what is the distribution of inside and outside industry 
experience in the management team and what effect does it have?  As the relative proportion of 
outside industry experience versus within industry experience increases (holding average tenure 
constant), two effects should be present.  First, the increased variety of perspectives and 
experience with different action types will increase the team’s cognitive complexity allowing for 
differentiation and integration of insights (Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983) and provide 
the space for novel recombinations (Baron & Ensley, 2006).  Similar to what studies of 
functional background have reported, variety in industry experience should influence the cues 
that different managers attend to and bring to the attention of the rest of the team (Dearborn & 
Simon, 1958; Beyer et al., 1997).  While certain firm actions may be dominant under all 
scenarios, on the margin it is expected that the increased availability of potential actions where 
team members have prior experience in executing and monitoring will increase the firm’s 
behavioral entropy (Langlois, 1986).  
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 And furthermore, from a process perspective the presence of individuals with perspectives 
from outside the industry should result in increased debate and dialogue regarding course of 
action (Simons et al., 1999), generating increased task conflict (Amason, 1996), all of which lead 
to more comprehensive decision processes (Frederickson, 1984; Forbes, 2007).  With increased 
decision comprehensiveness comes better accuracy in judgments, and often at reduced speed 
(Wally & Baum, 1994).  With a more comprehensive decision making process, “tried and true” 
actions will not be selected so quickly, and alternative, superior options considered instead. 
Taken together, social processes that encourage more careful deliberation and increased 
cognitive diversity should result in a more diverse set of actions.   
Hypothesis 2: The more heterogeneous the team’s industry tenure, the more 
complex the firm’s competitive repertoire will be. 
The conditioning effect of the industry life cycle 
 The industry life cycle has a substantive influence on the environment of decision that 
managers face (Gort & Klepper, 1982).1  A number of different literatures comment on the form 
of the industry life cycle, including the dominant design paradigm (Utterbeck & Abarnathy, 
1975), the Klepperian tradition in evolutionary economics (Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 
2002; Gort & Klepper, 1982), the organizational ecology school (Baum 1999), and studies of 
Red Queen competition (Barnett & McKendrick, 2004; Derfus et al., 2008).   
 Taken together, the insights from these traditions indicate that the life cycle will have an 
independent effect on the consistency and complexity of actions. Relating to consistency, the 
evolutionary economics perspective notes that in the first stage of the industry life cycle, a focus 
on product innovation would limit repertoires to mostly product development actions (Gort & 
                                                 
1 While there are many definitions of the industry life cycle, I adopt Gort & Klepper’s (1982) five stages.  In my setting, I can only observe the 
first three stages of the industry life cycle.  Thus, in hypotheses referring to “later stages”, this does not include Stage IV and V.   
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Klepper, 1982).  In later stages, companies experiment with a number of alternative business 
models and process innovation possibilities.  Subsequent to this period, repertoire consistency 
increases again either because a dominant design has been found (Suarez & Utterback, 1995), 
developing a niche is required to avoid competition for resources (Carroll, 1985), or increased 
operating barriers necessitates scale, learning, or process innovation economies (Agarwal, 
Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002).  Similarly, the life cycle should have a direct effect on complexity 
for several reasons. First, variety may be required in later stages where competitors are fitter on 
average (Agarwal & Gort, 2002; Barnett & McKendrick, 2004. Second, as the basis of 
competition shifts from product based to price or other attribute based competition, this 
necessitates a wider variety of actions in later stages - even though there may be a partial decline 
in complexity in Stages IV and V in the face of a more concentrated industry with very fit 
surviving competitors (Karniouchina, Carson, Short, & Ketchen, 2013).  
 Beyond these direct effects, I argue that the industry life cycle conditions the influence of 
top management team tenure on competitive repertoire by shaping managerial knowledge and 
industry competitiveness.   To begin, it is important to consider the relative timelines and 
information content of manager tenure versus the industry age (see Figure 2 for an illustration of 
these timelines and the stages of the industry life cycle in this context). Essentially, the content of 
the knowledge that tenure confers is based on the time it which it was learned (Reuber & Fischer, 
1999).  In later industry cycle stages, managerial tenure covers multiple periods of experience 
(and the lessons learned therein), whereas in earlier periods the lessons of tenure mostly relate to 
the “pre-history” of the industry (i.e., knowledge from closely related domains) and the focal 
industry’s early stages (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000). Relatedly, the 
knowledge set of the industry evolves, and the information “learned” in each year of tenure is 
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drawn from this updated set.  Since more information is learned in earlier years of executive 
tenure (Hambrick & Fukatomi, 1991) and this is the filter through which executives process new 
information, experience in later periods from both direct experience and through social 
connections may either be discounted, or interpreted and filtered through the lens of prior 
learning (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).  However, if the difference between prior learning and new 
information is so distinct that it cannot be related to existing knowledge structures, or if the 
expected means-end relationships no longer function (i.e., what was once a very profitable 
strategy now delivers very poor results) managers may update their cognitive structures to adapt 
to this new reality (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992).  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 Based on the above, I argue that the life cycle will weaken the tenure – consistency 
relationship for two reasons.2  One, competition in product and factor markets increases due to 
increased number of competitors (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), and a switch to process innovation 
and price competition from the product based competition in earlier phases (Gort & Klepper, 
1982).  Furthermore, the fitness of competitors increases through selection (Nelson & Winter, 
1982) and vicarious learning through the Red Queen effect (Barnett & McKendrick, 2004).  
Given the evolution of best practices, the formulae applied in prior years may no longer be 
sufficient due to competitor learning – prompting a need to search for new “best responses”, 
particularly as competitor dependence increases (Chen & MacMillan, 1992).  Since failing to 
adjust strategies can impact performance outcomes, problemistic search will cause the 
management team to collectively reconsider their current strategic trajectory (Boeker, 1997).  
                                                 
2 To be clear, this prediction holds until Stage IV.  During Stage V and later, industry recipes likely become ingrained and competition slackens. 
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Second, in later life cycle stages, the knowledge encapsulated in managerial tenure will cover a 
broader cross-section of competitive contexts in comparison to tenure largely learned during the 
pre-history of the industry.   
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between average industry tenure and repertoire 
consistency will be weaker later in the life cycle in comparison to earlier stages. 
 Similarly, the life cycle is anticipated to influence the relationship between tenure 
heterogeneity and repertoire complexity for two reasons.  First, knowledge variety is exploited 
only when it is needed, namely when changes in environmental entropy necessitate an increase 
in behavioral entropy (Langlois, 1986).  In other words, the costs of developing and maintaining 
capabilities to enact a variety of actions, and determining which action to take are incurred only 
when the cost of inadequate response is sufficiently high (Heiner, 1983).  As discussed above, a 
wider range of experiences across various industries confers the requisite variety of prior 
experience and expertise to perform a range of competitive actions (Ashby, 1956).  And this 
increased variety has economic benefit to the management team in later life cycle stages because 
increased competitiveness demands more numerous and nuanced responses.  Indeed, the level of 
competition increases from practically non-existent (essentially a common struggle for 
legitimacy) to actively managing competitor responses (Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006) and 
maintaining a sufficient pace of product and process innovation (Klepper & Simons, 2005). 
 Moreover, as the industry evolves, the knowledge base that industry participants require 
changes.  As the industry develops a number of submarkets (Klepper & Thompson, 2006), the 
type and quantity of customers in particular segments change. In servicing these various 
customer groups, the use of product innovation alone becomes insufficient to capture customers 
in the early and late majority subpopulations due to their lower willingness to pay for a particular 
performance level (Adner, 2004).  This results in process innovations that engender alternative 
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means of doing business, causing a qualitative shift in competition type from entrepreneurial 
actions to Ricardian and deterrent actions (Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006).  As a result, the relative 
value of outside experience should increase as the overlap of outside perspectives with the new 
competitive reality rises, while the value of earlier industry experiences begins to decline. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between tenure heterogeneity and repertoire 
complexity will strengthen in later life cycle stages (Stage III) in comparison to 
earlier stages (Stages I and II). 
Competitive repertoires, competitive pressure, and firm performance  
 There has been substantial empirical support for the claim that increases in repertoire 
complexity has a positive influence on absolute (Ndofor et al., 2011) and relative firm 
performance (Basdeo et al., 2006; Ferrier, 2001), while repertoire simplicity tends to have a 
negative impact (Miller & Chen, 1996; Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).  The received wisdom for this 
effect is summarized by Basdeo and colleagues (2006: 1208), who state, “diverse actions may 
achieve superior performance because diverse actions enable [firms] to generate more diverse 
advantages, which may be more difficult for competitors to imitate and compete away”. By 
contrast, Miller and Chen (1996a: 424) make a more comprehensive argument in discussing the 
opposite of repertoire complexity (i.e., repertoire simplicity), arguing that: “simplicity allows 
firms to develop the advantage of focus [and] develop core competencies that attract customers 
and defy imitation by rivals [… but] a competitive repertoire must be sufficiently comprehensive 
to address the relevant range of potential customer needs and customer challenges”. 
 Even in the absence of competition, complex repertoires can confer benefits.  Profit is 
generated from the complex interaction between different actions that comprise an underlying 
activity system (Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008), resulting in myriad complementarity and 
substitution effects between different action types which allow replication but not necessarily 
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substitution (Rivkin, 2001: 275).  For example, there are natural synergies between pricing 
actions and promotional activity, such that their simultaneous use in one market should increase 
revenues more than each activity in isolation. Process improvement capabilities and merger and 
acquisition activity may have similar synergies, a combination often used by private equity 
firms.  While the additional flexibility and complementarity of such combinations have a positive 
influence, it is possible for the firm to overextend, impeding the efficiency, repetition, and 
practice needed to cultivate distinctive capabilities.  However, there are several organizational 
designs that can mitigate these risks (e.g., Simsek et al., 2009).  For example, the use of a 
corporate venturing unit may be an effective way to enact entrepreneurial actions that would 
otherwise flounder in a bureaucratic setting (Burgelman, 1983).   
 Beyond these technical complementarities, the temporal order in which actions are 
executed can be structured to take advantage of temporal complementarities. For instance, a 
firm operating at capacity using a technology that has increasing returns to scale would do 
better to execute a capacity increase move prior to a price reduction move than vice versa, 
since the increased capacity will lower the average cost of production prior to the reduction in 
price. As Bridoux and colleagues (2013) demonstrated, the period of rent generation differs 
by action type, and thus balancing the causal cycle (Mitchell & James, 2001) of different 
action types may smooth performance gains over time as well.  
 By contrast, if firm activity in concentrated within only a few activity types, initial gains are 
made from returns to scale and learning advantages, but diminishing returns to those select few 
actions are likely to set in more rapidly.  For example, only so many merger and acquisition 
deals can be performed in a certain period before the breakeven deal is reached (McNamera, 
Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008), or only so many price cuts can produce a positive effect.  
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Furthermore, the actual benefits accrued may differ substantially from expectations when there is 
a time lag between when actions are planned and when they are executed.  One need look no 
further than the recent mortgage crisis to see an example of bank over-exposure to certain 
activities that led to detriments in overall performance.  By diversifying the firm’s portfolio of 
activity across multiple action types, the probability that any one particular action having 
deleterious consequences that impact the firm’s overall performance is diminished.  Taken 
together, the above arguments collectively suggest: 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the complexity of competitive actions taken, the higher 
the firm’s performance over the following year. 
 In competitive settings, when a firm pursues a complex set of actions, it is more difficult for 
competitors to fully imitate or otherwise create a substitute environment to mimic the focal 
firm’s value creation capabilities (Ferrier, 2001; Rivkin, 2000).  Increasing repertoire complexity 
makes wholesale copying of the repertoire prohibitively expensive, and when competing on 
complex performance landscapes, the cost of imperfect imitation can be large as well (Rivkin, 
2001b).  Moreover, even if the surface characteristics of the action portfolio can be replicated, 
the underlying pattern of specific activities that is unobservable to competitors is laden with 
causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). This causes further difficulties in matching the 
value creating capabilities of the focal firm, with the consequent effect that the incremental 
added value between the focal firm and the imitating competitor is not competed to zero, as 
would be expected from the competitive process (Kirzner, 1973).  Thus, even when competitive 
activity is very high, if the firm’s competitive repertoire is sufficiently complex to avoid 
substantive imitation, the value-creating nexus of the firm is not in jeopardy (Lenox, Rockhart, & 
Lewin, 2006).  By contrast, at lower levels of complexity, aggressive competitors are able to 
replicate the “secret sauce” and drive entrepreneurial rents to zero (Keyhani et al., 2015).   
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Hypothesis 6: As the number of total actions taken by competitors increases, the 
relationship between repertoire complexity and performance will strengthen. 
 While the complexity to performance relationship has received empirical attention in the 
past, investigations of the relationship between repertoire consistency and performance are 
scarce. The consistency of competitive repertoires was first studied in detail by Lamberg and 
colleagues (2009) in an effort to reconcile the findings from the competitive dynamics and 
strategic change literatures that state firms can and must adapt to their environments (e.g., Child, 
1972; Porter, 1980) and the evolutionary theory of the firm, which emphasizes the primacy of 
routines and technological trajectories (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982).  They argue that firms 
need to strike a “balance between being fully consistent with the past on the one hand, and being 
fully adaptive with environmental change on the other” (Lamberg et al., 2009: 49).   
 On the one hand, strategic consistency allows for economies of scale and scope to develop 
through learning economies, knowledge reuse, and investments in specialized structures and 
tools which stem the increasingly fine division of labor and substitution with fixed inputs 
(Langlois, 1997). Furthermore, consistency provides time for firms to optimize their 
informational systems, incentive structures, and associated routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). On 
the other hand, these structures and other initial conditions can generate inertia that makes it 
difficult for the firm to react against adaptive pressures that build over time (Simsek et al., 2015).  
Overly rigid structures with high levels of interdependence between the components make it 
difficult for the firm to adapt in times of change without altering large swathes of the 
organizational system simultaneously (Gersick, 1991) with the attendant hazards of 
organizational failure (Baum, 1999).  In the limit, the firm’s structure is totally rigid because of 
lock-in effects (Sydow, Schreyogg, & Koch, 2009).  Even if structural changes are not currently 
necessary, firms may be loath or cognitively unable to identify and take advantage of new 
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growth opportunities that do not fit the current business model (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). 
A prime example of this phenomenon is Polaroid’s inability to take advantage of the emerging 
digital photography market (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). 
 I conclude that these two forces result in a curvilinear relationship between strategic 
consistency and performance.  At low levels of consistency, none of the benefits of 
complementarity or learning can be realized and the firm cannot establish consistent goals and 
culture.  While the firm is able to freely adapt to changing environmental circumstances, the firm 
has not invested or developed the necessary capabilities to generate value in excess of its 
resource inputs (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996).  On the other hand, at high levels of 
consistency, overly rigid structures make it difficult for the firm to adapt to emerging problems 
or new opportunities. While the positive effects of complementarity are constant or perhaps have 
diminishing returns, the magnitude of the negative implications of rigidity increase as the level 
of strategic consistency rises – resulting in a curvilinear effect. However, at moderate levels of 
consistency, a balance is struck between these two extremes, allowing for structures and routines 
to be developed and honed, while providing residual flexibility that avoids the potential for 
cognitive (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or organizational lock-in (Sydow, Schreyogg, & Koch, 
2009).   
Hypothesis 7:  At low and high levels of repertoire consistency, there will be no 
significant relationship with performance, while at moderate levels, there will be a 
positive effect on performance in the following year. 
 As argued above, the influence of consistency on financial performance is driven by two 
effects, the positive influence of complementarity and learning effects, and the negative and 
increasing risks of mal-adaption caused by the structural rigidities.  I claim that competitive 
pressure does not substantively influence the level of complementarity or learning that a firm is 
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able to exploit, because these are aspects of the firm’s own production processes and internal 
capabilities.  By contrast, competitive activity has a very substantial effect on the structure of the 
factor and product markets where the firm buys and sells its goods and services (Chen, 1996).  
Very active competitors are either the cause, or are at a minimum are reacting to, changes within 
these marketplaces.   
 By contrast, lower competitive activity indicates stability within the industry, resulting in a 
lower industry “clockspeed”.  In such industries, the value of strategic flexibility (inconsistency) 
is diminished.  This is likely because the gains to flexibility are outweighed by the cost of 
maintaining the capabilities that confer these degrees of freedom, while the potential for mal-
adaption is relatively low (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007).  Further, these authors found in fast-
clockspeed industries the opposite pattern of results was found, which may indicate the risks of 
mal-adaptation outweigh the gains from stability in this context.  As a result, the likelihood that 
the firm’s current strategic direction is mal-adapted to current circumstances increases as the 
level of competitive activity rises.  Thus, only this detrimental effect of strategic consistency is 
affected by competitor pressure: 
Hypothesis 8: As the number of total actions taken by competitors increases, the 
level of repertoire consistency at which performance reaches a maximum will 
decrease, and the maximum performance achieved at this optimum point is lower. 
A summary of the hypothesized model is available in Figure 1. 
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CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL SETTING 
Appropriateness of setting 
I test my proposed model with a longitudinal panel of commercial 3D printer manufacturers 
(producers are found within NAICS codes 32351, 33271, 33211, 33331, and 33411).  The 
companies within the sample include all publicly traded firms covered by the industry’s leading 
research company (Wohler’s Associates) for the period 1988 through 2015 as well as a number 
of privately held firms where action, management team, and firm performance information is 
available.  Approximately ten years ago, the market for 3D printers bifurcated into two distinct 
segments: products targeted for commercial use (which had been sold since the 1980s) and 
products for consumer use (e.g., MakerBot and similar products).  I have limited my focus to the 
professional / consumer market in order to maintain continuity of focus across time, and to 
ensure that companies in the sampling frame are in competition with each other (cf., Carroll, 
1985).  Further, a number of firms were acquired during the period of observation, and these 
firms are treated as separate entities up until the point of acquisition.  When selecting the 
research setting for conducting this study, four key criteria were considered: access to 
information on the competitive repertoire, sufficient variability in actions taken by industry 
participants, identification of a near census of firms to capture life cycle and competitive 
variations, and a range of managerial backgrounds.  Taken together, these conditions provide the 
necessary variance on the variables of interest.   
 The 3D printing industry scores well on all of the above criteria.  First, in order to have 
observable variation on the competitive repertoire construct using existing methodologies (i.e., 
the structured content approach, see Chen & Miller, 2012), I needed access to specialty news 
outlets such as the Wohler’s Report, Econolyst, 3Ders, and Additive Manufacturing, in addition 
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to major news distributors such as The New York Times and The Economist.  Information from 
all of these sources was available through the Factiva service provided by LexisNexis.  In total, 
over 100 different sources were drawn from when constructing the database of activities and the 
full text of 20,179 articles was at risk for being reviewed for competitive action content.  A 
number of blogs and specialty news outlets that provide insight into new trends and activities by 
3D printer manufacturers of all sizes was also included in this data collection effort but the full 
text of these articles could not be recovered (only the leading paragraph).   A subset of these 
articles were in other languages (17,568 in English, 1,575 in German, and 1,036 in Swedish).  
Only articles written in English were subject to coding.   
Second, and related to the first, there must be sufficient variation in competitive actions 
undertaken in the industry of interest to ensure that observed complexity is a proxy for the 
potential complexity that a firm’s repertoire can exhibit (Langlois, 1986).   Because the industry 
is dynamic and relatively young at 30 years of age and entering into a period of significant 
growth, it is a testbed for a number of different alternative business models and the competitive 
actions that are associated with those models.  Firms continue to assess their place within the 
industry vis-à-vis other players, and continue to determine what competitive moves are best 
suited to capture customers (D’Aveni, 1994).  As studies in the organizational ecology and 
economics literature demonstrate (e.g., Dowell & Swaminithan, 2006; Klepper, 1997; Klepper & 
Simons, 2005), the period of time from industry founding until the shakeout is a time of many 
firm foundings and rapid growth within the competitive space.  At the same time, the industry is 
sufficiently developed by 2015 to allow different competitors to undertake a range of 
competitive maneuvers, such as entrepreneurial, Ricardian, deterrent, and cooperative actions 
(Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006).  Industries earlier within their lifecycle may not yet have the 
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requisite financial or cognitive resources to engage in a wide variety of actions, while older 
industries may have established institutions and well tested business models and cognitive scripts 
that impede action variety.  A review of the descriptive statistics regarding the competitive 
repertoires of the firms in the sample indicates that this variety is present.  In particular, Figure 3 
illustrates increasing trends for the typical number of actions taken, as well as higher average 
levels of repertoire complexity over time.  All coded action types (marketing, pricing, capacity, 
service, and new product) were present within the sample from 1991 forward, with each action 
type accounting for at least 800 coded actions (the number of actions within each grouping 
ranges from 893 to 3288).  This provides evidence that actions of all types were undertaken by 
the firms in the sample, and the high average level of complexity (approximately .70 out of a 
scale from 0-1) indicates that firms exhibit variety in the actions they perform across time. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Third, since I examine the industry life cycle and competitive conditions, a near-census of 
firms is required for two reasons.  First, a census of firms allows me to identify the trends in 
founding and closures.  Second, having both large and small firms allows me to examine the 
competitive dynamics not only for the dominant players, but for more peripheral competitors as 
well.  Trends in firm entry, exit, and concentration are shown in Figure 4.  As the graphic 
illustrates, the industry has seen a surplus of entries in comparisons to exits (exits include 
acquisitions) such that the total tally as of 2015 is 62 firms. However, the number of firms with a 
market share of greater than 1 percent has largely fluctuated between 6 to 14 firms from 1994 
until the present. Further, the concentration of the industry has increased from its nadir in 1994. 
This indicates that while entrants continue to pour into the industry, the majority of these entrants 
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do not have a material effect on the competitive environment within the industry.  A tally of the 
firms in the industry is available in Exhibit A for every year in the sampling frame (based on 
records of units sold in the Wohler’s Report from 1988 – 2015).  Firms within the sample vary in 
size and available resources to engage in competitive activity.  On the one hand, several firms 
have been publicly traded for several years and have sold tens of thousands of units, while other 
firms remain private and have only sold approximately 100 units since their entry into the 
market.  Thus, a wide range of capabilities are present within the sample.  These firms are also 
geographically diverse, and are located in the United States, Japan, Germany, Israel, and the UK.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Finally, the industry is old enough and has roots in related industries such that a cadre of 
veterans can be identified through spin-offs and firm dissolutions, as well as new participants 
because the underlying technological bases of the industry continue to shift.  My initial research 
into the setting indicated that there were a wide variety of managerial backgrounds represented 
from printing, metals, and other industries (Wohler’s Report, 2013).  These initial indications 
have been borne out through the detailed analysis of the data, which indicates a wide range of 
backgrounds and in many cases the importation of executives from existing companies to new 
ventures whether through acquisition or through the founding of new firms.  However, while 
there is an overall trend towards higher levels of focal industry experience within the top 
management team over time, new additions from unrelated industries such as banking, consumer 
products, and other areas continue to provide a source of external knowledge and insights as the 
industry matures.  Figure 5 provides a summary of the firm genealogies, and a measure of the 
relative balance between focal and outside industry experience within the management team. 
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------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
In addition to the above criteria, the 3D printing industry also has the attractive feature of 
being partially isolated from substitute products and technologies based on subtractive 
manufacturing methods.  This isolation stems from differences in the economic models for 
subtractive and additive manufacturing products.  While subtractive methods have very low 
variable costs of production, the fixed cost for dies, tools, and other set-up fees are substantial.  
By contrast, while the variable costs (in terms of both time and materials) for additive 
manufacturing are significantly higher, the fixed cost of production are often limited to the 3D 
printer itself (Anderson, 2012).  As a result, companies purchasing 3D printers will self-select 
into using these types of services only when subtractive methods are not cost-effective.  As a 
consequence, 3D printer manufacturers largely compete with one another, rather than with 
subtractive methods, at a given level of production. And finally, from a managerial standpoint, 
the 3D printing industry is poised to impact the fates of many different fields, such as medicine, 
process manufacturing, and small-scale production.  As D’Aveni (2015: 48) notes, “thinking 
about the unfolding revolution in additive manufacturing, it’s hard not to reflect on that great 
transformative technology, the internet.”   
Dataset construction 
Dataset construction proceeded in three steps: the construction of a sampling frame, the 
procurement of data from a number of sources, and matching of that data to the sampling frame.  
The sampling frame commences in 1986 because it is the year of founding for the first firm in 
the industry, and is two years prior to the first recorded 3D printer sale.  Several of the major 3D 
printer technologies were in existence (e.g., stereolithography was already developed and 
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patented in 1986, see Hull, 1986) but others were not developed until later (e.g., selective laser 
sintering, see Deckard, 1989).  Few firms are in the sampling frame until 1994, which “was a 
pivotal year for the rapid prototyping (RP) industry -- and it was the most progressive year in its 
history. More systems were sold in '94 than were sold in '92 and '93 combined. Many user 
companies purchased second and third systems, and a few companies now have as many as a 
dozen. Tens of thousands of RP jobs were processed last year -- more than ever before. Service 
providers also experienced a banner year, with record revenues and growth. After-market 
products and services began popping up regularly, a sure indication that RP is indeed an industry 
to watch” (Wohler’s Report, 1995: 1). Furthermore, Wohler’s Reports, the pre-eminent source of 
knowledge regarding the industry, was first published in 1993.  In summary, the choice of 1986 
as the start of the sampling frame is appropriate because it is prior to a number of major 
developments within the industry, and thus the risk of left-truncation is mitigated.  The sample is 
tracked as of 2015 to maximize the number of observations that are admissible into the sample, 
and captures an increasingly dynamic period within the industry’s development.  2016 data has 
yet to be released for most firms.  
In each of these years, the criterion for inclusion of a firm into the sampling frame for a 
particular year is the recording of at least one 3D printer sale.  Using this criteria, a theoretical 
maximum of 766 firm-years was obtained, summarized in Appendix A.   The implication of this 
approach is that firms that were founded at an earlier point in time, but had yet to sell a unit, are 
not included in the analysis until sales commence.  Data on the top management team, firm 
actions, and firm performance were constructed from a variety of sources listed in Table 1.  Top 
management team data was collected at the individual executive level, compiled at the executive-
firm-year level and aggregated to the firm year level.  For example, an executive with 4 years of 
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prior industry experience in an executive position prior to joining a firm, and 3 years of tenure in 
the management team would have 7 years of focal industry experience.  They would have 8 
years of experience in the following year if they remained on the team.  Action data was 
similarly aggregated to a firm-year level using the measures described below, while performance 
data was naturally at a firm-year level of analysis.  Figure 6 provides a graphical illustration of 
how the panel was constructed.   
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Data was collected for each aspect of the model and matched to the appropriate firm-year.  
Unfortunately, a number of observations were incomplete, largely due to lack of available return 
on asset information for small, private firms and the lack of available information for the entire 
top management team (the operationalization is provided in the next section).   As a 
consequence, and as shown in Appendix A, while there are 273 firm-year observations of 
competitive repertoires, 303 firm-years of TMT data, and 221 ROA observations, only 165 
observations are shared across all data types (the complete dataset drops further due to the 
presence of leading and lagged variables and “0”s within the ROA source dataset which indicates 
that the source does not possess the actual value, resulting in the effective sample sizes ranging 
from 87 to 163 for the tested models).  In spite of these data matching challenges, the dataset is 
still sufficiently robust to generate sufficient power to detect the moderate effect sizes found in 
prior investigations, as shown in Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER 5 – METHODS 
Variables and measures 
All of the dependent and independent variables of interest are listed in Table 1. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable - Competitive Repertoires.  I synthesize existing conceptualizations to 
define the competitive repertoire as the entire range of the actual competitive actions used by a 
firm during a given year to attract, serve, and keep customers.  A repertoire is composed of 
concrete decisions such as price changes, product line or service alterations, and changes in the 
scope of operations (Miller & Chen, 1996: 420; Chen & Miller, 2012: 145).  To be clear, when 
discussing competitive actions, I refer not only to externally directed actions such as price 
changes and new product introductions (cf. Smith et al., 2001), but also major internal initiatives 
to boost the competitive position of the firm such as capacity increases and the like.  Therefore, I 
adopt the inclusive but generalizable approach of Ferrier and Lyon (2004) in coding the actions 
taken by firms in my sample. 
Consistent with prior researchers (e.g., Chen & Miller, 1994; Connolly et al., 2016; Ferrier & 
Lyon, 2004), I code firm actions through a structured content analysis of press articles and news 
reports as compiled by Factiva.  All articles flagged as pertaining to the firm of interest were 
included in the initial search, which totaled 20,179 articles.  Using the search terms specified by 
Ferrier and Lyon (2004), articles were coded into one of five distinct action types: product, 
marketing, capacity, price, and service related (I dropped the sixth classification, signaling, 
because it represents an intention to act rather than an action in and of itself). Both market facing 
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as well as internal changes were encoded using this approach. Using the count of each action 
type within a calendar year, I constructed a repertoire vector of the form R = (r1, r2, ri … rn), 
where the ri are equal to the number of actions of type i.  These repertoire vectors were generated 
for 184 firm-years with at least one action (and 273 firm-years in total if years when no actions 
were performed are included).  These repertoire vectors are comprised of 11,993 coded actions.  
Because these articles were coded through the use of computer-aided text analysis, I conducted a 
random sample of the coded articles to determine whether my own codings were in agreement 
with that of the computer (with the codings blinded).  Overall agreement across all action types 
was 86%, with 172 agreements out of 200.  Interrater agreement (ICC(2,2) =. 58, CI95 = [.44, 
68]) is sufficiently high to rely upon the results of the coding (Cicchetti, 1994).  The majority of 
the disagreements related to two issues:  the miscoding of stock-price related discussions as 
pricing actions and the lack of coding for certain new product introductions that did not include 
the required indicator phrases.  
The dependent variables (repertoire complexity and consistency) and relevant control 
variables (repertoire volume) were calculated from these repertoire vectors. Volume is calculated 
by summing all actions taken by the firm in a given year.  This measure captures the overall level 
of competitive activity undertaken by the firm in a given year.  Complexity is measured using a 
Shannon entropy index, and captures the relative balance of actions across different action types. 
As would be expected from an entropy index, complexity provides a measure of the difficulty of 
guessing what action a firm will take next in a given sequence.  Conceptually, complexity 
captures the firm’s ability to engage in a broader range of action types (Connolly et al., 2016). 
Finally, repertoire consistency captures the stability of actions in comparison to the historical 
trajectory of firm (Lamberg et al., 2009).  Consistency is computed using a normalized 
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displacement vector that incorporates information about the magnitude and direction of the year-
to-year change in a firm’s competitive repertoire (see Lamberg et al., 2009 for further details). In 
a fully consistent repertoire, the number of actions may change so long as the relative proportion 
between each action type remains the same.  By contrast, a completely inconsistent repertoire is 
one where the firm performs none of the actions that it performed the prior year, and instead 
chooses to perform a completely different set of actions in the current year.  The typical levels of 
each of these repertoire facets in each year is shown in Figure 3. 
Dependent Variable - Performance. Consistent with prior work, I use market share to 
measure performance changes (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999).  Market share 
provides an indication of the relative advantage of one firm over its rivals. Even though my 
definition of the competitive repertoire includes actions that are not exclusively product market 
facing, changes in internal structures are often made in order to compete more effectively in 
product markets.  The average market share is 4%, but this figure is skewed with the median 
market share equal to 1% across the entire observation window.  I also use return on assets to 
measure performance changes (e.g., Derfus et al., 2008; Nadkarni et al., 2015; Young et al., 
1996).  The results regarding ROA were expected to (and indeed did) not align perfectly with 
those found for market share.  This is because ROA is often a benchmark for performance during 
later stages of the life cycle once industry growth slows and begins to reverse (which increases 
the salience of profitability and the need to generate free cash flow above and beyond investment 
needs).  However, companies within the earlier life cycle stages may instead prioritize growth 
(and capturing a share of the market) rather than maximizing returns to available assets.  The 
average return on assets was -2% for the sample, but exhibited high variability (23%) due in part 
both to quick growth resulting in major returns to small asset bases and major investments that 
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temporarily reduce profitability.  
Independent Variables – Managerial Experience.  I code the managerial tenure of the top 
management team through a manual review of executive biographies, CVs, and other literature 
such as EDGAR 10-K filings and S-1 prospectuses for companies that recently went public.  In 
line with prior work (e.g., Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), I define the top management team as the 
top two levels of the organizational structure, starting with the level of CEO and other C-suite 
members.  This conceptualization captures those members of the organization that are tasked 
with major, important, and unstructured decisions.  In practice, this typically means that all 
members of the organization that have either the terms “Chief” or “Executive VP” in their titles 
were included as part of the top management team.  For companies in Japanese and European 
contexts, this definition also includes managing directors where “Chief” positions are not used.  
The average size of the TMT was 2.64, due in part to the small size of the TMT during the early 
years of venture operation prior to later growth.  This is evidenced by the median value of 3, 
which is higher than the mean – indicating a large proportion of solo-founders during the early 
stages of these firms is bringing down the average.   
I measure the distribution of executive tenure within the top management team by computing 
both the average and the standard deviation of tenure for all TMT members. When determining 
how much tenure an individual has within the industry, all years of management experience 
within the 3D printing industry prior to joining the focal firm are considered.  Further, every year 
on the management team is also another year of industry experience, and thus adds to their 
existing stock of tenure within the industry.  While the amount of experience gained by 
executives may vary from year to year due to different rates of skill and knowledge acquisition 
(Reuber & Fischer, 1994; Finkelstein et al., 2009), tenure is a commonly used and valid measure 
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for assessing accrued experience within an industry (e.g., Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & 
Frederickson, 1993).  In supplemental testing, I also directly compute the total amount of focal 
industry experience possessed by the management team as well as the average amount of 
experience outside of the focal industry through a manual compilation of each executive’s prior 
experiences generated through a triangulation of executive biographies, regulatory filings, and 
LinkedIn data.  While I have tracked industry experience within 3D printing directly, closely 
related industries (traditional printing and lasers), and somewhat related industries 
(manufacturing and high-technology), for these reported analyses I have drawn a bright-line 
distinction between 3D printing industry experience and all other types.  Furthermore, in coding 
executive experience I only coded prior experience as relevant to the extent it is in a senior 
managerial capacity (i.e., a position of VP or higher).  This means, for example, prior work as a 
low-level employee in an earlier 3D printing firm would not qualify as executive-level prior 
focal industry experience.  
Moderating variables. Since my moderating hypotheses are monotonic with respect to 
changes in the life cycle, I assess the moderating effect of the industry life cycle changes using 
the age of the industry.  As noted by Gort & Klepper (1982), the industry life cycle is a time path 
that summarizes the state of the industry’s development.  The age of the industry provides a 
smooth measure of change within the market place and preserves variation in the moderating 
variable, rather than using a discrete measure.  However, I also constructed a discrete life cycle 
stage variable through a cluster analysis of nine different indicators (firm count, entries, exits, net 
change, industry concentration, sales, cumulative sales, and sales growth rate), consistent with 
Agarwal & Gort’s (2002) generalized discriminant procedure, but for which I make no 
assumptions regarding the status of the industry life cycle for any observation.  Three distinct 
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clusters emerged which were largely consistent with a partitioning of the sampling frame using 
sales figures alone.  Details of these supplemental analyses are available upon request, and the 
clustering solution and underlying characteristics used for the analysis are available in Figure 7. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
By contrast, while the industry life cycle may smoothly unfold over time, the competitive 
implications of the life cycle can be more erratic and dependent upon interactions between the 
competitors within the industry (Porter, 1980).  As a consequence, I modeled the competitive 
pressure exerted by competitors more directly through the construction of a competitive pressure 
measure.  This measure is the sum of all of the actions taken within the industry in a given year 
less the actions of the focal firm.  This measure provides an estimate of the number of actions 
that are either moves or countermoves of rival firms that inhibit the rent generating potential of 
the firm’s actions (Derfus et al., 2008).  In other words, the competitive pressure can be 
considered as a summary of overall competitor activity in a given year (Young et al., 1996). 
Control Variables. In the estimation of the repertoire complexity and consistency models, a 
number of other traits of the TMT, the firm, and the environment may be relevant for 
ascertaining the effect of TMT tenure.  First, the size of the TMT may influence the overall 
number and diversity of perspectives within the management team, even for two teams with the 
same tenure distribution. All else equal, larger TMTs have been shown to act and react less 
frequently (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996).  Second, the age of the TMT members may 
influence decision making patterns through the channels of risk propensity, cognitive 
functioning, team cohesion and other factors (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).  Thus, both the average 
age and age heterogeneity are included as control variables. At the firm level, organizational 
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memory has more routines and procedures to perform a wider variety of actions encoded as the 
firm ages.  Moreover, the extent to which a firm is motivated to act likely depends on their 
current position, available resources and capabilities, and potential threats.  Thus, I control for 
the prior amount of competitive activity performed by the firm, and market share in the prior 
period to account for available capabilities and prior performance.  To control for potential 
threats, I include the prior level of competitor activity.  Firm size is measured using the logarithm 
of total assets in a given year, and for some models missing values are mean imputed. Finally, 
public status may influence the amount of press coverage related to the firm (and thus the 
relative observability of the repertoire) as well as placing pressures on the firm to perform 
actions beyond what the team would select if they had full control (Connolly et al., 2016).   
When estimating the performance models, a lagged performance variable is included in 
several specifications to account for the potential for reverse causality between actions and 
performance (i.e., more actions can be taken because the firm was successful in the past) (Miller 
& Chen, 1996).  For both the market share and ROA models, year of firm founding, firm size, 
and whether the firm is publicly traded are also controlled for.  Moreover, since the number of 
actions taken may have a unique performance effect, I include a control for action volume. To 
account for industry-level influences on performance, I also include controls for the age of the 
industry, current levels of concentration, and the sales volume growth rate for the prior period. 
Statistical methods and identification strategy 
Since all dependent variables are conceptually continuous (performance, consistency), or are 
arbitrarily scaled to the unit interval (complexity) all models are estimated using least-squares 
based panel regression methods and with robust standard errors (Greene, 2012).  The current 
repertoire is used to predict performance in the following year to preserve the causal ordering of 
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actions and consequences.  I present the descriptive statistics and correlations in Table 1A.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1A about here 
------------------------------------------- 
For my primary analyses, I estimate the performance and repertoire consistency models 
separately in order to appropriately select control variables that are pertinent to each construct of 
interest –and to simplify the methods required to test the hypotheses under consideration. 3  A 
primary concern in testing models of firm behavior when decision makers anticipate 
performance consequences is the presence of endogeneity, resulting in inconsistent estimates.   
As it relates to the identification of causal effects in my repertoire models, I primarily rely 
upon the structure of the panel dataset and my research design, using prior year controls in order 
to isolate the incremental effect of the variables of interest.  In particular, I have included a 
number of explicit controls for prior performance and capabilities in my repertoire models.  
Further, the volume of actions taken in prior years may influence the available choices in the 
current year is included as a control to capture the tendency to reuse existing routines.  For the 
assessment of managerial experience on repertoire characteristics, I have not found any 
convincing instruments that would allow me to perform an instrumental variables analysis as a 
further safeguard against endogeneity.  To be specific, my prior endogeneity concern in the case 
of the repertoire models instance is one of reverse causality – that in order to support a 
particularly complex or consistent repertoire, executives are selected on the basis of having that 
relevant experience.  There is some conceptual justification as to why this reverse causality bias 
may ultimately be minor.  Specifically, while it is possible that particular functional experiences 
correlate with which industries an executive has worked in, it is unlikely that industry 
                                                 
3 An alternative estimation strategy for the repertoire model is estimating repertoire composition directly.  However, this approach will likely a 
high residual standard error and thus low power to detect changes in repertoire characteristics. 
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background will be the most salient choice variable for executive selection (self- or otherwise), 
nor are firms using maximizing or consciously targeting a particular level of complexity or 
consistency and thus this becomes a primary justification for selection (although the example of 
Apple and LVMH in the hypotheses section does indicate that the risk is present).   To the extent 
that this potential bias cannot be controlled for, the results should be interpreted accordingly.  
However, as it related to individuals self-selecting into management teams on the basis of 
expected future performance, to the extent that this selection is driven by prior success or level of 
competitive activity, these explanations are partially accounted for by the control variables.   
With respect to the potential for endogeneity between repertoire characteristics and 
subsequent performance, a similar issue of reverse causality may be present, as is the potential 
for unobserved firm differences that simultaneously affect repertoire formation while also 
influencing performance (e.g., dynamic capabilities).  In an attempt to address the reverse 
causality issue, as part of my main analyses I also estimate a dynamic panel model with the 
previous year’s performance included to account for reciprocal effects of previous performance 
on repertoire composition.  To account for the potential time-invariant omitted variables such as 
underlying capabilities or initial resource endowments, I also estimate fixed effects and 3SLS 
models (using the complexity and consistency models as the first stage) as robustness checks.  
Beyond these issues, I consider potential selection effects due to the potentially non-random 
nature of media coverage, and the implications thereof for estimating the performance equations.  
In order to account for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors are employed.  Similar results 
were obtained using yearly cluster-robust standard errors.  Interaction terms were mean centered 
in order to facilitate interpretation and reduce collinearity, and the VIFs for all independent 
variables were below the recommended value of 10 (Kennedy, 2003).  
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CHAPTER 6 – RESULTS 
Competitive repertoire models 
 Testing the repertoire complexity model begins with the inclusion of the control variable set. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the results discussed.  In Model 1a, TMT size, prior market 
share, and status as a public firm were associated with repertoire consistency, with industry age 
having a positive but insignificant effect on consistency.  Model 1b introduces the influence of 
both average TMT industry tenure and tenure heterogeneity as measured by the standard 
deviation of TMT industry tenure.  Both of these variables have a significant influence on 
repertoire consistency, with the coefficient of the average tenure variable providing support for 
Hypothesis 1 (b = .029, se = .006, p < .001).  The incremental effect of these additional variables 
is significant (∆R2 = .12, p <. 001).  In Model 1c, the moderating effect of the life cycle, as 
measured by industry age, is introduced.  To facilitate interpretation, the time variable is centered 
near the midpoint of the observation window (i.e., 2007).  While the main effect of average TMT 
tenure is significant and the pattern of interaction is consistent with the predicted effect, there is 
insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 3 (b = .000, se = .001, p > .10).    
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 Turning to the examination of repertoire complexity, I begin with the control variable model.  
As shown in Model 2a, prior market share is predictive of repertoire complexity, with industry 
age having a marginally significant effect.  Introducing the main effects of TMT tenure 
distributions in Model 2b, average TMT industry tenure is associated with more complex 
repertoires. Furthermore, TMTs with more heterogeneous industry tenures have more complex 
repertoires, in line with Hypothesis 2 (b = .052, se = .016, p < .01).  As Model 2c illustrates, as 
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the industry progresses through its life cycle, tenure heterogeneity appears to result in less 
complex competitive repertoires, rather than repertoires that are more complex.  This pattern of 
results contrasts to the prediction of Hypothesis 4 – a result that I will examine later in this 
section (b = -.005, se = .002, p < .05). This interaction effect implies that while complexity tends 
to increase in the later stages of the industry life cycle, the relative importance of tenure 
heterogeneity in achieving this complexity is lessened. 
Firm performance models 
 Testing the performance model commences with an analysis of the pooled panel market 
share model, with Table 3A summarizing the results.  In Model 3a, the year of founding is 
negatively relatively related to market share, as is public status.  Firm size is positively related to 
market share.  Model 3b introduces the influence of complexity on market share, which is not 
significant, failing to support Hypothesis 5 (b = .043, se = .037, p > .10).  Model 3c introduces 
the effect of consistency, for which a negative curvilinear hypothesis was advanced.  The data 
are inconsistent with Hypothesis 7, since the coefficient of the squared consistency term is 
positive but insignificant, while the linear term is positive and significant.  The overall test of the 
significance of the linear and quadratic terms indicates that they marginally increase the fit of the 
model (∆R2 = .04, p <.10).  Turning to the moderating effects, Model 3d considers the 
moderating influence of competitive pressure on the complexity to performance relationship.  
The coefficient is significant, in support of Hypothesis 6 (b = 1.4E-4, se = 5.0E-5, p < .01).  
Finally, Models 3e and 3f introduce the moderating effect of competitor action volume on the 
repertoire consistency to market share relationship.  There is no significant interaction for the 
first order term.  By contrast, the second order interaction term is negative, but it is insignificant 
and the overall pattern is different than the predicted effect (b = -1.9E-4, se = 1.0E-4, p < .10).   
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------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3A about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 Turning to the dynamic panel model, which accounts for the prior level of market share (and 
essentially is a test of whether repertoire characteristics predict changes in market share), we find 
that industry age is positively related to share changes, concentration is negatively related to 
share changes, and the prior year’s market share is highly predictive of market share in the 
following year (i.e., t-1 to t+1) (see model 3g).  Model 3h introduces the influence of complexity 
on market share, which has only a marginal effect (b = .197, se = .108, p < .10).  Model 3i 
introduces the effect of consistency, for which a negative curvilinear hypothesis was advanced.  
The data are inconsistent with Hypothesis 7, since although the coefficient of the squared 
consistency term is positive, and nearly significant (b = .108, se = .060, p < .10).   
 Concluding with the tests of the hypothesized moderating effects, Model 3j considers the 
moderating influence of competitive pressure on the complexity to performance relationship.  
The coefficient is not significant nor does the introduction of the moderation increase the 
predictive power of the model, failing to support Hypothesis 6 (b = 1.4E-5, se = 3.3E-5, p > .10). 
Finally, Models 3e and 3f introduce the moderating effect of competitor action volume on the 
repertoire consistency to market share relationship.  There is no significant interaction for the 
first order term.  The second order interaction term is consistent with the arguments for 
Hypothesis 8, with the coefficient being negative and significant (b = .001, se = 6.0E-4, p < .01).  
This indicates that competitive pressure does appear to induce a dampening effect on 
performance that increases at higher levels of consistency, but the overall pattern of the 
interaction differs from what was expected, resulting in a lack of support for H6.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3B about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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 Turning to the pooled panel ROA model (Table 3C), Model 3m indicates that the aggregate 
level of firm actions in the current year is negatively related to subsequent ROA.  Industry age is 
predictive of ROA. Publicly traded firms are associated with a lower level of ROA, which 
becomes significant in more saturated specifications.  Model 3n introduces the influence of 
complexity on ROA, which has a positive but insignificant effect (b = .197, se = .108, p < .10).  
However, the overall increase in the model R2 is significant, resulting in partial support of 
Hypothesis 5.  Model 3o introduces the effect of consistency, for which a negative curvilinear 
hypothesis was advanced.  The data are inconsistent with Hypothesis 7, because while the 
coefficient of the squared consistency term is negative, it is insignificant.  By contrast, the linear 
term is positive and significant (b = .308, se = .114).  The overall test of the significance of the 
linear and quadratic terms indicates that they increase the fit of the model (∆R2 = .06, p <. 05).  
 Concluding with the tests of the hypothesized moderating effects, Model 3p considers the 
moderating influence of competitive pressure on the complexity to performance relationship.  
While the direction of the interaction term is in line with the predicted effects, the coefficient is 
not significant nor does predictive power of the model increase, failing to support Hypothesis 6 
(b = 1.1E-4, se = 1.6E-4, p > .10).  Finally, Models 4e and 4f introduce the moderating effect of 
competitive pressure.  There is no significant interaction for the second order term, and the effect 
is marginal (b = -.001, se = 3.0E-4, p < .10).  A similar set of results and coefficients are 
obtained for the dynamic panel model, with the exception that the marginal effect for Hypothesis 
5 is no longer present. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3C and 3D about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Alternative specifications and further analyses 
 The preceding models examining the relationship between the competitive repertoire and 
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return on assets only considered cases where at least one action was performed in a given year.  
However, there are a number of firm-year observations where actions take place in the year 
before or after, but no actions are observed in that year.  In order to increase statistical power, I 
include these additional cases, increasing the number of observations from 91 to 139.  Including 
these observations is justified since the lack of observed actions does not necessarily constitute 
the lack of a competitive repertoire, but rather an extended period in which the firm was 
observed but no actions were undertaken. The results for this alternative specification are 
provided in Tables 4A and 4B.   
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4A and 4B about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 As Table 4A indicates, complexity is significantly associated with ROA, providing support 
for Hypothesis 5 (b = .182, se = .067, p < .01).  Hypothesis 7 remains unsupported due to a 
positive and significant linear term (b = .240, se = .093, p < .05) but a negative but insignificant 
quadratic term (b = -.212, se = .242, p > .10).  Hypothesis 6 now has marginal, but insignificant, 
levels of support (b = 1.4E-4, se = 7.8E-5, p < .10), with only with a marginal increase in the 
regression R2.  The evidence for Hypothesis 8 is similar to the results already presented (b = 
5.1E-4, se = 2.7E=-4, p < .10).   While neither of these effects are significant at the p < .05 level, 
it is beneficial to show the pattern of interaction of both repertoire characteristics for illustrative 
purposes.  Figure 8 provides a graphical illustration of these interactions, but the reader is 
cautioned in interpreting them. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 With respect to the competitive repertoire composition models, the proposed model was 
tested using team-wide compositional measures of experience such as the average and the 
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standard deviation of industry tenure.  However, the logic of the hypotheses is also consistent 
with the direct use of overall experience measures rather than group summary statistics.  In the 
alternative specification provided in Table 5, I replace the average tenure variable with a total 
focal industry experience measure to capture the complete feedstock of relevant insights rather 
than their distribution across team members.  In concert, instead of approximating the presence 
of outside industry experience through the use of a heterogeneity measure, I explicitly measure 
the level of outside experience held by the team members.  Using these substitutions, I find 
support for an interaction between average tenure and industry age in predicting repertoire 
consistency, supporting Hypothesis 3 (b = -.002, se = .000, p < .001).  I also continue to find the 
opposite of the expected effect for Hypothesis 4 (b = -.001, se = .001, p = .05) when substituting 
outside experience for tenure heterogeneity.   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 In order to better understand the relative importance of focal experience relative to 
experiences from other industries for repertoire complexity and consistency, I construct a 
balance variable that takes the difference between the total amount of focal industry experience 
within the team and the typical amount of outside industry experience.  This difference is used 
because while each year of focal industry experience contributes to the “know-how” and “know-
who” of the team, prior experiences garnered in other settings serve primarily as a counterweight 
for each individual to prevent them from over-relying on specific industry recipes and formulae.  
The results of this analysis are presented graphically in Figure 9.  Specifically, as the industry 
evolves, the relative balance between inside and outside experience becomes less important over 
time, in contrast to the logic of Hypothesis 4.  Indeed, there appears to be a convergence to an 
“equilibrium” level of complexity that occurs whether teams are skewed towards either type of 
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experience. This may provide a partial explanation for the unexpected result for Hypothesis 4: 
while in early life cycle stages the presence of heterogeneity indicates at least someone with 
prior related experience (and a major boost to the level of complexity) in later stages the 
presence of variation does not have the same effect.  Similarly, the relative balance between 
inside and outside industry experience becomes less pivotal in explaining variations in repertoire 
consistency. Furthermore, the more the team’s experience is weighted towards the focal industry, 
the faster this adjustment, consistent with the logic of Hypothesis 3.    
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Robustness tests  
To address potential omitted variable bias in the performance analyses, I use a series of fixed 
effects models to control for time-invariant unobserved firm differences for both the market 
share as well as the performance model as reported in Models 6a to 6f of Table 6. When 
accounting for firm fixed effects, changes within the level of complexity within a particular firm 
are not associated with significant changes in return on assets.  By contrast, after controlling for 
unobserved firm differences, the predicted form of the consistency to ROA relationship becomes 
very clear, providing support for Hypothesis 7.  In Models 6d to 6f, I examine fixed effects 
models for market share, and find no support for either Hypothesis 5 or 7.  Interestingly, over 
84% of the variation is explained by the base model (in comparison to 43% in Model 3a), 
indicating that between firm variation accounts for a large fraction of the overall variability. 
Since my hypotheses were generated based on a hypothetical comparison across firms, the 
pooled panel and dynamic analyses were better suited as the primary test of these effects. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Second, I wanted to investigate a significant concern, namely that the observability of firm 
actions is likely non-random.  By this I mean that strategic, major, quantum initiatives are more 
likely to be reported.  Also, firms that are larger in size are more likely to have the press 
capabilities and media coverage to publicize their activity.  I used a tobit-2 selection model 
(Heckman, 1979) to determine whether my market share models are systematically biased by 
underreporting of firm actions (I cannot do the same for my ROA models because I do not have 
sufficient instances where ROA is reported but actions are not to obtain reliable estimates).  For 
these analyses, I use total media mentions as an additional exclusion condition since coverage 
per se should not result in higher financial returns.  While the inverse Mills ratio was significant 
or nearly significant for the models tested, the results for the coefficients of interest were not 
significantly different than the results reported in the next section (the details of these analyses 
are available upon request). I also performed a supplemental analysis that directly includes total 
media mentions to an additional control in a further attempt to isolate the effect of non-random 
reporting of firm activities.  As discussed above, this could be the result of active PR divisions or 
a preference for or bias against a particular organization held by media outlets. While this 
variable was significantly related to ROA and market share, no significant differences were 
found for the coefficients of interest when including this additional control.   
Finally, the model proposed is a system of equations.  While my proposed approach was to 
consider each equation separately, I also estimate the overall model using the technique of three 
stage least squares (3SLS) in order to improve estimation efficiency, account for cross-model 
correlations, and account for the fact that complexity and consistency are present as both a 
predictor and a predicted variable (Zellner, 1962). The model is identified through all variables 
in the first stage (the models that predict repertoire complexity and consistency) being 
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exogenous, while complexity, consistency, and their interaction terms are endogenous to the 
system.  For all models, a separate analysis of the 2SLS estimates indicates that the instruments 
are strong (see footnotes to tables 7A and 7B).   The abridged results of this analysis (I show 
only the fully saturated models) are reported in Table 7A (where the complexity interaction is 
tested) and Table 7B (where the consistency interaction is tested), respectively.  These models 
are largely consistent with the results presented up until this point, with Hypotheses 1 and 3 
supported.  However, after accounting for cross-equation correlations, there is no significant 
main effect for heterogeneity on complexity in the early stages of the industry life cycle – in 
contrast to Hypothesis 2.  There is marginal evidence for Hypothesis 4 in Model 7d, but not 7h, 
with this loss in significance likely due to the significant reduction in sample size in comparison 
to the model that was independently estimated.   
In reference to Hypotheses 5 and 6, the individual test of the coefficients is made difficult 
due to the loss of efficiency by using the first stage projection of their predicted values.  
However, based on a joint test of these coefficients through a likelihood ratio test, the complexity 
terms and its interaction with competitive pressure are found to be significant in the case of 
ROA, but not for market share.  For ROA, the pattern is consistent with prior findings.  The joint 
hypotheses 7 and 8 are significant for the both the market share and the ROA model.  In the case 
of ROA, this provides some level of support for a moderated inverted-U relationship, whereas 
the market share results are more complex as previously discussed. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 7A and 7B about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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CHAPTER 7 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We know from prior work that both environmental forces and managerial backgrounds 
influence firm decision making, and we have accumulated evidence to suggest that both forces 
can influence the competitive repertoires that stem from these decisions.  However, until now we 
did not have direct empirical evidence regarding the influence of the industry life cycle on 
competitive repertoires, nor did we have any information about how the life cycle shapes (or fails 
to shape) the influence of managerial experience.  Further, while prior research has generated 
correlations between industry tenure, tenure heterogeneity, and competitive repertoires (see 
Appendix B for examples), a concerted investigation into the joint effect of focal and outside 
industry tenure on competitive actions had yet to be performed.  Finally, existing research 
assumes that the primary mechanism by which repertoires influence performance outcomes was 
through its ability to stymie competition. To address these concerns and limitations, I developed 
a novel model of the influence of TMT tenure on competitive repertoires.  This model also 
recognized the conditioning effect of the industry life cycle – as manifested by industry age and 
the level of competitive activity respectively – in shaping both the form and outcomes of 
competitive repertoires.  
Summary of findings 
Across a wide variety of model specifications, there was broad support for the assertion 
that TMT prior industry experience increases the level of consistency in firm competitive 
repertoires.  This represents a large-sample statistical test of the arguments set forth by Lamberg 
and colleagues (2009).  Building from this, I argued that this relationship would weaken over 
time as the industry developed a more robust set of strategic alternatives and competitive 
pressures forced firms to modify the scope of actions undertaken.  While my initial test did not 
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find evidence of this effect, subsequent examinations using the 3SLS approach and total industry 
experience found support for this effect.  Turning to the influence of tenure heterogeneity and 
outside experiences on the complexity of the competitive repertoire, a number of significant but 
un-hypothesized effects were found.  I argued that the relationship between tenure heterogeneity 
and performance would be weak in earlier stages and then strengthen over time as competitive 
pressures mounted.  However, the data strongly suggest (using both a direct measure of outside 
experience and a measure of tenure heterogeneity) that while outside experiences are associated 
with more complex repertoires in early life cycle stages, this relationship weakens over time.  
Digging deeper into this effect, I examined the relative balance between inside and outside 
industry experience (Figure 9) and uncovered that all firms seemed to be converging to an 
equilibrium level of complexity regardless of their experience distribution.  Put a different way, 
the data suggests that while in earlier life cycle stages outside experience is necessary to develop 
a sufficiently complex repertoire, in later stages all firms can develop the necessary capabilities 
and do not need to rely upon the background of the managers to achieve this end.  Furthermore, 
even if managers could further enhance the complexity of observed repertoires, there appears to 
be a “pull” towards an equilibrium level of complexity. 
As it relates to my hypotheses regarding the effect of the competitive repertoires on firm 
performance, several specifications indicate that there is a positive main effect between 
repertoire complexity and firm performance as measured by both market share and return on 
assets.  However, this effect was not robust after accounting for unobserved firm fixed effects, 
which may indicate that some other latent quality of the firms may be the underlying driver of 
this significant effect.  Furthermore, there is some, but inconclusive, evidence for both market 
share and return on assets to suggest that repertoire complexity takes on greater importance in 
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increasingly competitive environments (in particular, these results were not robust to controlling 
for prior levels of the dependent variable in either case).  Note that I cannot test my moderating 
relationships in a fixed effects setting due to the construction of the moderating variable – the 
fixed effects transformation results in a lack of identification (this is because the mean 
differences between each firm’s number of competitive actions is averaged out). 
By contrast, the predictions regarding the curvilinear relationship at average levels of 
competitive pressure between repertoire consistency and performance were largely unsupported.  
In fact, in the case of market share there is some evidence to suggest that the relationship is U-
shaped, rather than the inverted U-shaped relationship hypothesized.  This may be due to the fact 
that market share is likely maximized using a subset of the overall space of actions (i.e., a focus 
on price and marketing actions), and thus firms that consistently focus on these activities will 
gain higher market shares.  However, one interesting result is the very strong support for the 
inverted-U relationship argued for in Hypothesis 6 in the firm fixed-effects model.  This result 
indicates that, holding unobserved firm traits constant, variations in repertoire consistency traces 
a very distinct curvilinear relationship.  This provides an indication that for an individual firm, 
there may be an optimal level of repertoire consistency, but that this optimum point varies across 
firms resulting in the lack of support in the models that pool across firms.  There are a number of 
models where there is “marginal” evidence (i.e., insufficient to conclude significance but 
suggestive) that the second order effect of consistency – which I claim relates to mal-adaption - 
is increasingly negative as competition increases, and this evidence is consistent across multiple 
specifications. Table 8 provides a summary of the evidence for each of the tested hypotheses. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Theoretical and empirical implications 
The results above are consistent with prior work that shows repertoire complexity is 
influenced by managerial knowledge, and that it has a significant influence on firm performance 
(e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).  Moreover, as Appendix B indicates, the observed 
correlations are generally in line with the correlations found in previous studies.  However, the 
results presented above add to our understanding in three ways.  First, while not hypothesized, 
the results indicate that average industry tenure has an influence on repertoire complexity – 
which indicates that grounded insights specific to the industry may be important to engage in a 
broader set of firm activities.  Second, while heterogeneity in industry tenure in the earlier phases 
of the life cycle facilitate the performance of more diverse repertoires, in later life cycle stages 
high repertoire complexity is achieved across varying levels of heterogeneity.  While it may be 
the case that further complexity is unnecessary, an alternative explanation could be that higher 
levels of tenure heterogeneity induce process losses from differences in worldviews within the 
management team.  This could result in making decisions only when all parties can agree, 
reducing the variety of actions undertaken by the team (similar to the findings of Hambrick, Cho, 
& Chen, 1996).  However, such an explanation would not also account for the finding that the 
overall level of outside experience has a similar effect, nor that the level of complexity in later 
stages in relatively high in comparison to earlier stages.    
Second, this work is the first large-scale quantitative test of the repertoire consistency 
construct.  The results indicate that repertoire consistency is predicted by both the average tenure 
of the TMT as well as its heterogeneity, and that it is correlated with performance outcomes (in 
line with to the earlier findings of Lamberg and colleagues).  Moreover, the performance 
analyses provide evidence that the consistency construct has predictive power as it relates to 
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market share and return on assets.  The presence of significant findings (although not 
consistently of the hypothesized functional form) indicates that the repertoire consistency 
construct can be applied in a different industry and that the construct has predictive validity in a 
larger setting, as well as a different stage in the industry life cycle.  However, variation in the 
repertoire consistency construct has significant overlap with repertoire complexity, and it may be 
necessary to perform analyses of discriminant validity using multiple facets to uniquely identify 
the domain of the construct.  What appears to be the case is that the values of consistency and 
complexity both depend upon the number of free action type parameters – and with a greater 
number of potential action types at play, the greater the range that both constructs can span.   
The findings regarding the effect of consistency on market share were the opposite of the 
expected pattern of findings.  Further investigation into this relationship is required to explain the 
divergence between the pattern of results for these two performance variables.  However, the 
most likely explanation is the market share does not capture all of the hypothesized aspects of 
repertoire consistency on performance (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).  Specifically, the 
performance gains from a high level of consistency could be caused by a relentless focus on 
marketing and pricing actions, which achieve the goal of growth, but may not be optimal from 
the standpoint of profitability.  Further tests with alternative variables such as Tobin’s Q or an 
intermediate step such as gross profit margins for publicly traded firms may provide further 
insight into this divergence in the pattern of results.  
The inconsistent set of findings regarding the moderating effect of competitive pressure 
were surprising.  Much of the argumentation provided within the competitive dynamics literature 
regarding the mechanisms by which repertoire characteristics drive performance hinge upon the 
ability of the repertoire to mitigate the effects of competitive pressure (e.g., Basdeo et al., 2006).  
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However, in neither the case of repertoire complexity nor the case of repertoire consistency was 
the moderating influence on competitive pressure persistent or robust.  One possible explanation 
for this is that the market is growing at a rate that allows competitors to take actions with relative 
independence.  Or in other words, the spillover effects of competitive actions during the 
observed phase of the life cycle are still too small to be significant.  A comparative analysis of an 
industry that has progressed through later stages of the life cycle could be instructive to 
determine at what point these competitive interactions begin to have a significant effect (Baum, 
1999). This could represent a boundary condition in competitive dynamics research, where the 
regimes of the performance generating mechanisms of competitive repertoires begin to shift from 
value creation (in earlier life cycle stages) to value capture (in later life cycle stages). 
Future testing 
These results provide a number of future research directions that follow-on studies using this 
or similar datasets can tackle in greater detail.  First, there is evidence to suggest that firms 
increasingly cluster around a stable level of complexity as the industry evolves.  This may 
indicate that firms have searched the landscape of possible levels of complexity and arrived at an 
optimal value.  One implication of this is that there could be a curvilinear relationship between 
the level of complexity and firm performance.  This implication could be tested using the 
existing dataset, and sufficient variation would be present within the panel to undertake this 
investigation.   
Second, the results suggest that managerial background variables have a substantive effect on 
the pattern of firm activity, but that their influence wanes over time.  However, what has yet to 
be investigated is what specific action types these different experience distributions facilitate or 
hinder, and how firms are able to develop more complex responses in the absence of managerial 
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backgrounds.  One can ask whether vicarious learning is taking place, or whether the type of 
outside experience is varying over time.  For instance, could it be that in earlier stages outside 
experience was from closely related domains (and thus similar to focal industry experience) 
whereas in later stages more distal domains are being tapped?  Again, finer-grained data 
regarding the specific relevance of prior managerial backgrounds exists and could be used to 
model how the overall experience distribution evolves over time.  
Third, there are a number of alternative means of capturing the pattern of firm activity over 
time, such as changes in the pattern of firm investments which can be considered an indicator of 
strategic change (Wowak, Mannor, Arrfelt, & McNamara, 2016).  Future work could combine 
the approaches of assessing actions via a structured content approach and an alternative measure 
of strategic change in order to assess the internal consistency and validity not only of the 
measures, but of the patterns of firm action over time.  In other words, are the firm’s forward 
looking investments consistent or inconsistent with the actual actions that they are taking, or are 
they “building castles upon sand”?  In a similar vein, while I conceptualized changes in the 
competitive environment as the level of actions taken by competitors and the life cycle of the 
industry as years from founding, conceptually and empirically these measures have a great deal 
of overlap, and future research can focus on these commonalities and distinctions to determine 
under which conditions either measure is conceptually and empirically appropriate.  In the case 
of this particular study, the use of competitive pressure allowed for the possibility that strong 
competitors would experience changes in industry status differently from less active rivals.  This 
may not be as relevant in other contexts.  Alternative measures may also exist, such as the 
overall stock of industry knowledge, which could provide a more direct test of some of the 
mechanisms discussed in hypotheses 1 – 4.  
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Finally, through additional data collection (likely involving data on additional industries) it 
may be possible to explicitly separate the beneficial and harmful aspects of competition in line 
with work in population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  There are a number of interesting 
zero-order correlations between competitive conditions and performance that can be explored in 
more detail.  In particular, there is a positive relationship between competitive pressure and 
return on assets.  While this effect becomes negative once other control variables are entered into 
the model, it does suggest that competitive activity can be associated with positive returns to the 
extent that it illustrates a vibrant and growing market.  If data is available to compare industries 
that have similar growth in competitors but vary in the level of competitive actions undertaken, it 
may be possible to separate the symbiotic aspects of competition from the detrimental “head-on” 
version.  
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the study that bound the conclusions that can be drawn 
from this data.  First, despite tapping a number of databases and alternative sources of 
information, the overall sample remains relatively small and thus the power to detect small 
effects remains relatively low.  Fortunately, many of the firms in the sample are still in operation 
and have not been subject to acquisition, which means that several more observations will be 
available in the near future.  Moreover, while the overall number of firm-year observations is 
relatively low, both public and private firms, US and international, acquired and free-standing, 
de novo and de alio firms are within the dataset which mitigates the risk of age, size, and 
governance related biases.  It is important to note that while I was not able to collect managerial 
and action data for all firms within the industry space, there was significant variability in 
outcomes (both in terms of performance and survival) among these companies which ameliorates 
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to some degree the risk of selection bias.  That said, there remains the risk that were complete 
data on these very small firms available, the results could differ.  
Second, my investigations to date were not able to uncover a sufficiently compelling set of 
instrumental variables to induce exogenous variation in managerial backgrounds.  However, I 
was able to utilize the first stage predictions of complexity and consistency (with particular 
emphasis on the interaction between tenure distribution and the life cycle) as a way to induce 
exogenous variation in the competitive repertoire.  Beyond this instrumental variables approach, 
the fixed effect estimations provide some indication of how robust these effects are to 
unobserved firm differences (in the case of consistency, the pattern becomes clearer, and in the 
case of complexity, it provides some evidence to suggest that unobserved variables may be 
driving both complexity and performance).  Further, the Tobit models indicate that the results are 
not significantly biased by non-random reporting of actions.  A review of the data indicates a 
relatively steep decline in average activity levels and the complexity of firm repertoires 
immediately in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009. This may indicate a potential 
exogenous shock that induces TMT retirements and / or repertoire shifts in the face of new 
constraints on firm operations, which can be used for future analyses in this setting.   
Third, while I followed established practice in performing the structured content analysis of 
firm actions, my independent validation of these actions did not result in unanimous agreement.  
Additional work may need to be done in order to increase the reliability of the coding process – 
perhaps through the use of multiple dictionary and semantic methods.  In addition, while the five 
action types discussed in Ferrier and Lyon (2004) provide a generalizable and tractable approach 
for action coding, alternative schemes with greater detail exist such as Nokelainen’s (2008) 
typology or Offstein and Gynawali’s (2005) taxonomy.  It may be useful to re-perform these 
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analyses with a more fine-grained taxonomy of action to examine repertoire complexity and 
consistency in more fine grained detail (i.e., both can be measured with greater precision as the 
number of action types increases).  Furthermore, a comparative test between the two approaches 
may provide a bridge between earlier studies relying on coarse-grained measures in comparison 
to the fine-grained approach in more recent studies (e.g., Connelly et al., 2016).  
Fourth, while my study has attempted to parse out and examine the joint distribution of 
within and outside industry experience, and explicitly controls for age effects, there are a number 
of alternative experiences that TMT members accrue over their careers that may result in similar 
predictions.  For example, functional background or educational diversity could be competing 
explanations for the predicted effects, and would need to be accounted for as alternative 
explanations (e.g., Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996).  Moreover, it could be that there is a more 
overarching construct such as CEO variety (Crossland, Zyung, Hiller & Hambrick, 2014) which 
may more parsimoniously explain the distinctions made within this manuscript while also 
capturing variations in these other, related types of experience.  
Conclusions 
In summation, this study takes a first step towards understanding the rich and multifaceted 
interface between management experiences and the environment of decision in which they 
operate.  The competitive repertoire provides a window into how decision making processes 
unfold within the firm through the observation of an artifact of decisions made in the past.  As 
with many studies, more questions are raised by these results than answered, but it provides a 
first step towards unpacking the causes and performance consequences of competitive repertoires 
and the pattern of decisions they represent. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Prototypical Timelines of Firm and Industry Experience4 
 
 
                                                 
4 Producers shown are those companies with greater than .1% market share at the time of measurement. 
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FIGURE 3 
Repertoire Trends over Time 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Firm Entry, Exit, and Concentration Patterns 
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FIGURE 5 
Selected Firm Genealogies, Performance Data Availability, and Relative Experience Distributions 
 
 
Genealogies include all firms that have sold 100 printers or more for which at least some archival information was available for review. 
 
 
Experience Distributions calculated as Total Industry Experience (Measure of Specific Knowledge) – Average Outside Experience (measure of typical outside knowledge). 
Company Name Unit Sales 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Stratasys 21,293                         
3D Systems 12,688                         
Envisiontec 7,128                           
Z Corp. 7,029                           
Objet 4,752                           
Solidscape 3,784                           
EOS 2,132                           
DWS 1,186                           
Roland DG 660                             
Concept Laser 539                             ?
German RepRap 485                             Founded 2012
CMET 451                             
DTM 434                             
Helisys 377                             
D-MEC 322                             Founded 1990
Optomec 313                             
ExOne 300                             
Arcam 250                             Founded 1998
Wuhan Binhu 237                             In Operation
SLM Solutions 225                             Founded 2009
Trumpf 156                             
Phenix Systems 113                             
BigRep 111                             
Nanoscribe 105                             
ReaLizer 104                             
Renishaw 101                             Entered market
MTT Technologies 92                               
Voxeljet 74                               
Founded 1991 In Operation with Financials Available
Founded 1986 In Operation with Financials Available
Founded 2002 In Operations with Financials Available
Founded as Sanders Prototype Renamed Solidscape In Operation - Limited Data Acquired by Stratasys
Founded 1994 In Operations with Financials Available Acquired by 3D Systems
Founded in 1998 In Operations with Financials Available Merged with Stratasys
In Operation with Financials Available
Founded 2000
Founded 1989
Founded 2007 - no data in this period In Operation - Limited Data ?
In Operation with Financials Available - Parent Company
Renamed DTM In Operation with Financials Available Acquired by 3D Systems
Founded 1992 In Operation with Financials Available Went out of business
Predecessor companies
Entered market In Operation with Financials Available
Acquired by 3D Systems
In Operation with Financials Available - Parent Company
Founded 1998 In Operation
Founded 2001 In Operation with Financials Available
In Operation with Financials Available
Founded Nova Automation 
In Operation - Limited Date
In Operation with Financials Available
Year
In Operation - Limited Data
In Operation - Limited Data
In Operation with Financials Available
In Operation with Financials Available
In Operation with Financials Available
Predecessor companies
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation with Financials Available
In Operation with Financials Available Acquired by Renishaw
Company Name Unit Sales 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Stratasys 21,293                                 (8)                     (6)                     (6)                     (2)                     1                      -                  7                      9                      11                    13                    15                    11                    14                    17                    20                    23                    26                    29                    (20)                  (18)                  (21)                  (16)                  
3D Systems 12,688                                 (21)                  (20)                  (19)                  (18)                  (17)                  (16)                  (15)                  (20)                  (18)                  (16)                  (15)                  (11)                  (7)                     (1)                     6                      10                    14                    2                      (7)                     (3)                     0                      3                      9                      14                    20                    25                    25                    28                    44                    35                    
EnvisionTEC 7,128                                    (12)                  (10)                  (8)                     (10)                  (7)                     (4)                     (1)                     2                      5                      8                      11                    14                    17                    16                    
Z Corporation 7,029                                    (19)                  (20)                  (18)                  (16)                  (14)                  (7)                     (2)                     2                      6                      10                    14                    15                    1                      (8)                     (6)                     (4)                     (2)                     -                  (27)                  
Objet 4,752                                    (13)                  (14)                  (11)                  (8)                     (5)                     (3)                     (19)                  (18)                  (17)                  (16)                  (15)                  (15)                  (14)                  (16)                  (13)                  
EOS 2,132                                    (16)                  (15)                  (14)                  (13)                  (12)                  (11)                  (10)                  (9)                     (8)                     (7)                     (6)                     (5)                     (4)                     (3)                     (2)                     (1)                     -                  1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7                      3                      7                      11                    
Roland DG 660                                       (17)                  (18)                  (19)                  (20)                  (21)                  (22)                  (23)                  (24)                  (25)                  (26)                  (27)                  (28)                  (29)                  (30)                  (31)                  (32)                  (33)                  (34)                  (35)                  (36)                  (37)                  (38)                  (36)                  (37)                  (38)                  (39)                  (40)                  (40)                  (36)                  (32)                  
Concept Laser 539                                       (10)                  (11)                  (11)                  (8)                     (5)                     (2)                     1                      4                      7                      10                    13                    16                    19                    22                    25                    28                    
German RepRap 485                                       (5)                     (6)                     (7)                     (14)                  
CMET 451                                       (32)                  (30)                  (28)                  (26)                  (24)                  (30)                  (27)                  (27)                  (24)                  (33)                  
DTM 434                                       (28)                  (29)                  (28)                  (27)                  (22)                  (18)                  (14)                  (11)                  (8)                     (5)                     (2)                     
Helisys 377                                       (11)                  (12)                  (10)                  (8)                     (9)                     (6)                     (14)                  (15)                  (12)                  (9)                     (6)                     
D-MEC 322                                       (35)                  (34)                  (33)                  (30)                  (28)                  (26)                  (24)                  (22)                  (21)                  (18)                  
Optomec 313                                       (11)                  (10)                  (9)                     (11)                  (10)                  (7)                     (8)                     (4)                     3                      9                      15                    21                    27                    33                    39                    45                    48                    
ExOne 300                                       (29)                  (28)                  (27)                  (33)                  (31)                  (29)                  (27)                  (22)                  (17)                  21                    18                    
Arcam AB 250                                       (17)                  (16)                  (15)                  (14)                  (13)                  (12)                  (11)                  (10)                  (9)                     (7)                     (5)                     (6)                     (4)                     (2)                     7                      
SLM Solutions AG 225                                       14                    17                    20                    23                    (3)                     0                      
Trumpf 156                                       (15)                  (16)                  (17)                  (20)                  (21)                  (22)                  (19)                  (20)                  (21)                  (22)                  (19)                  (16)                  (11)                  (6)                     (1)                     4                      9                      14                    19                    24                    29                    34                    
Renishaw 101                                       (31)                  (32)                  (33)                  (34)                  (35)                  (36)                  (37)                  (33)                  (30)                  (31)                  (30)                  (31)                  (32)                  (33)                  (31)                  (32)                  (33)                  (26)                  (19)                  (12)                  (5)                     2                      
MTT Tech 92                                         (7)                     (6)                     (5)                     (4)                     (3)                     (2)                     (1)                     -                  1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      (21)                  (22)                  (23)                  
Voxeljet 74                                         (10)                  (11)                  (12)                  (13)                  (14)                  (15)                  (12)                  (9)                     (6)                     (2)                     2                      6                      10                    14                    19                    25                    31                    
Average Across Companies (19.00)             (19.00)             (19.00)             (18.00)             (18.40)             (18.60)             (17.80)             (18.20)             (17.59)             (16.64)             (17.04)             (15.37)             (13.83)             (12.10)             (9.79)               (9.90)               (9.00)               (8.94)               (9.43)               (10.14)             (12.06)             (10.70)             (8.50)               (6.20)               (2.81)               (2.16)               (4.06)               0.12                5.88                7.33                
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FIGURE 6 
Panel construction example 
 
 
 
Firm A
CEO 1
CMO
CFO
T
M
T
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20001994 2001
Firm B
CEO 2
Firm-year status: 
Performance; market share; 
Firm repertoire of actions
Firm C
(New venture)
(Did not survive)
TMT-firm-year status: 
Measures of demography 
and team structure
Industry-year status: 
Life cycle stage; number 
of competitors
Top Management Team Tenure, Competitive Repertoires, and Firm Performance in the 3D Printing Industry (1988 – 2015)  
79 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
Industry Life Cycle Validation 
 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Firm Count 2 3 4 7 9 11 15 16 21 21 24 24 23 25 31 31 33 35 36 35 38 36 38 38 42 41 50 62 
Firm Count 
>1% MS 
2 3 3 6 7 9 11 10 12 11 13 13 10 12 10 14 12 8 9 6 8 9 9 9 9 7 8 12 
Net Change 2 1 1 3 2 2 4 1 5 - 3 - (1) 2 6 - 2 2 1 (1) 3 (2) 2 - 4 - 9 12 
Firm Entries 2 1 1 3 3 2 4 2 5 1 3 - - 5 8 1 3 2 2 - 3 3 2 7 6 3 13 12 
Firm Exits - - - - (1) - - (1) - (1) - - (1) (3) (2) (1) (1) - (1) (1) - (5) - (7) (2) (3) (4) - 
Concentration 0.89 0.82 0.85 0.34 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.34 0.31 0.21 
Sales 34 104 114 82 111 157 320 525 792 1,043 988 1,184 1,319 1,296 1,468 1,864 2,862 3,533 4,156 4,945 5,019 4,497 6,178 6,530 7,815 9,876 12,859 12,557 
Cum Sales 34 138 252 334 445 602 922 1,447 2,239 3,282 4,270 5,454 6,773 8,069 9,537 11,401 14,263 17,796 21,952 26,897 31,916 36,413 42,591 49,121 56,936 66,812 79,671 92,228 
Growth Rate   4% -10% 7% 8% 18% 14% 12% 8% -1% 4% 2% 0% 2% 4% 7% 4% 3% 3% 0% -1% 4% 1% 2% 3% 4% 0% 
Cluster 
Analysis 
Assignment 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Plot ID No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
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FIGURE 8 
The Conditioning Effect of Competitive Pressure on the Repertoire to ROA Relationship 
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FIGURE 9 
The Effect of Industry Experience on Repertoire Complexity and Consistency 
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TABLE 1 
Variables Investigated 
Variable Construct/Facet Definition Operationalization Data Sources Coding 
Prior Experience 
Prior Industry 
Tenure 
Industry-related 
experience 
Experience acquired in the course of industry 
tenure (Finkelstein et al., 2009) that provides 
a set of grounded insights and industry 
recipes (Spender, 1989) 
Average and total number of years current 
TMT has worked in any of the companies 
within the industry (multiple versions 
available, the “strictest” version is used) 
Primary: Bloomberg executive biographies 
Secondary: ThomsonONE 
Tertiary: Company websites, LinkedIn, 
EDGAR 10-Ks 
Continuous: Number of years of 
experience computed from stated 
history, also divided by active members 
Outside Industry 
Tenure  
Experience imported 
from other industries 
Experience acquired outside of the focal 
industry that may or may not be useful in the 
current context  
Average and total number of years that 
TMT has worked in industries outside of 
the focal industry 
Continuous: Number of years of 
experience computed from stated 
history, also divided by active members 
Industry Tenure 
Heterogeneity 
Variety in the amount 
of industry tenure 
within the team 
Separation and variety diversity related to 
prior experiences, means and mindsets (see 
e.g., Harrison & Klein, 2007) 
Standard deviation of industry tenure within 
the team 
Continuous, computed using data from 
all members of the team at a given time 
Competitive Repertoire 
Consistency Change in firm 
position  
Actions consistent with external changes and 
firm history (Lamberg et al., 2009) 
Magnitude and direction of change in 
principal component space 
 Primary: Factiva; LexisNexis 
 Future Sources: 3Ders 
 
Multinomial: Actions coded to a 
particular location within a taxonomy, 
taxonomy elements associated with a 
repertoire vector and assigned a date 
stamp 
Continuous: Taxonomy elements 
combined to develop measures at left 
Complexity Variety of actions 
taken 
The ability to engage in a broader range of 
action types (Ferrier et al., 1999) 
Entropy index of repertoire components 
using action taxonomy 
Volume Number of actions 
taken 
A summary of overall competitive activity 
by one firm in a year (Young et al., 1996) 
Count of all actions taken by firm in a given 
year 
 Performance 
Accounting 
 
Absolute 
performance 
Level of profits holding assets constant, and 
taking into consideration opportunity costs 
Primary: Return on assets (ROA) Primary: COMPUSTAT 
Secondary: PrivCo (US Private) 
Tertiary: LexisNexis 
Continuous: ROA as reported in dataset 
Market share Relative performance Proportion of shipments per year compared 
to industry total 
Primary: Market share 
 
Primary: Wohler’s Reports Continuous: computed using data 
available from datasets 
Moderating Variables 
Industry Age Progress along 
industry life cycle 
The amount of time that has elapsed since 
the first firm has entered the new market  
Number of years since the first firm was 
founded (i.e., 3D Systems in 1986) 
 Primary: Wohler’s Reports Continuous: Computed as Current Year 
– 1986 
Life Cycle Stage Discrete position in 
industry life cycle 
The regular cycles that industries progress 
through as they age (Klepper, 1997)  
Cluster analysis of several industry level 
variables 
 Primary: Wohler’s Reports Discrete (I, II, III) 
Competitor Vol. Amount of 
competitive activity 
by other firms 
A summary of overall competitive activity in 
a given year (Young et al., 1996) 
Count of all actions taken by all firms in a 
given year less the actions taken by the 
focal firm 
 Primary: Factiva; LexisNexis Continuous: computed from volume data 
of all competitors 
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TABLE 1A 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variable Mean SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Average Tenure 5.81 4.62 214              
2 SD Tenure 2.16 2.60 214 0.19             
3 Volume 52.16 110.69 184 (0.01) 0.38            
4 Complexity 0.59 0.35 184 0.23 0.36 0.35           
5 Consistency 0.56 0.34 184 0.26 0.34 0.28 0.63          
6 Market Share (t+1) 0.04 0.14 606 0.13 0.28 0.24 0.13 0.21         
7 ROA (t+1) (0.02) 0.23 154 0.27 (0.06) (0.13) 0.13 0.19 0.11        
8 Competitor Pressure 487 602 184 0.18 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.07 (0.15) 0.15       
9 Industry Age 2005 6.82 766 0.23 0.18 0.29 0.28 0.19 (0.22) 0.23 0.73      
10 Market Share (t-1) 0.04 0.16 591 0.09 0.24 0.27 0.12 0.23 0.93 0.00 (0.17) (0.23)     
11 ROA (t-1) (0.03) 0.24 153 0.28 0.04 0.15 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.55 0.28 0.32 0.17    
12 No. of Competitors 33.41 9.95 766 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.22 (0.25) 0.18 0.71 0.94 (0.23) 0.28   
13 Firm Age 6.50 6.45 766 0.46 0.54 0.47 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.44 0.29 0.16 0.32 0.23  
14 Public Firm .22 .17 766 (0.13) 0.41 0.31 0.10 0.11 0.43 (0.32) (0.07) (0.12) 0.43 (0.31) (0.13) 0.22 
15 Media Mentions 1,251 1,787 298 0.14 0.59 0.41 0.29 0.41 0.68 0.11 (0.11) (0.14) 0.68 0.22 (0.13) 0.29 
16 TMT Size 2.64 1.60 254 (0.06) 0.46 0.28 0.31 0.29 (0.04) (0.07) 0.49 0.56 (0.02) (0.01) 0.56 0.21 
17 Tenure Distribution 8.22 3.92 214 (0.60) 0.08 0.18 (0.10) (0.17) (0.04) (0.21) 0.11 0.12 (0.00) (0.16) 0.13 0.15 
18 Focal Ind. Tenure 14.96 14.32 254 0.59 0.57 0.26 0.41 0.46 0.12 0.09 0.54 0.57 0.06 0.15 0.55 0.47 
19 Outside Ind. Tenure 21.31 6.26 214 (0.34) 0.11 0.21 0.09) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16) 0.22 0.23 (0.01) 0.11) 0.22 0.34 
20 HHI 0.22 0.07 766 (0.03) (0.08) 0.11 (0.05) (0.06) 0.27 0.08 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.00 (0.01) 
21 Growth Rate 0.03 0.04 766 (0.13) 0.00 (0.06) (0.14) (0.15) 0.01 (0.09) (0.19) 0.42) 0.04 0.16) 0.40) 0.15) 
22 Volume (t-1) 43.74 107.07 184 (0.01) 0.39 0.85 0.32 0.35 0.22 (0.18) 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.13 0.35 0.45 
23 Comp. Pressure(t-1) 540 699 184 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.13 (0.14) 0.10 0.86 0.73 (0.14) 0.23 0.84 0.06 
24 Average TMT Age 48.82 6.68 214 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.17 (0.00) 0.30 0.33 0.17 0.08 0.29 0.64 
25 SD TMT Age 8.94 5.20 214 (0.32) (0.06) (0.03) 0.03 (0.01) (0.36) 0.09 0.02 0.04 (0.39) 0.06 0.06 (0.46) 
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TABLE 1A 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variable Mean SD N 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 Average Tenure 5.81 4.62 214            
2 SD Tenure 2.16 2.60 214            
3 Volume 52.16 110.69 184            
4 Complexity 0.59 0.35 184            
5 Consistency 0.56 0.34 184            
6 Market Share (t+1) 0.04 0.14 606            
7 ROA (t+1) (0.02) 0.23 154            
8 Competitor Pressure 487 602 184            
9 Industry Age 2005 6.82 766            
10 Market Share (t-1) 0.04 0.16 591            
11 ROA (t-1) (0.03) 0.24 153            
12 No. of Competitors 33.41 9.95 766            
13 Firm Age 6.50 6.45 766            
14 Public Firm .22 .17 766            
15 Media Mentions 1,251 1,787 298 0.53           
16 TMT Size 2.64 1.60 254 0.11 0.19          
17 Tenure Distribution 8.22 3.92 214 0.36 0.11 0.15         
18 Focal Ind. Tenure 14.96 14.32 254 0.02 0.28 0.72 (0.31)        
19 Outside Ind. Tenure 21.31 6.26 214 0.33 0.17 0.16 0.94 (0.13)       
20 HHI 0.22 0.07 766 0.02 0.18 (0.03) 0.08 0.01 0.09      
21 Growth Rate 0.03 0.04 766 0.07 0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.20) (0.04) (0.17)     
22 Volume (t-1) 43.74 107.07 184 0.30 0.39 0.36 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.05 (0.11)    
23 Comp. Pressure(t-1) 540 699 184 (0.11) (0.09) 0.48 0.16 0.50 0.24 0.20 (0.26) 0.30   
24 Average TMT Age 48.82 6.68 214 0.34 0.37 0.11 0.56 0.25 0.78 0.09 (0.10) 0.23 0.30  
25 SD TMT Age 8.94 5.20 214 (0.22) (0.29) 0.29 (0.31) (0.01) (0.48) (0.17) 0.07 (0.03) (0.01) (0.72) 
Note: Due to the differences in sample sizes across variables, correlations are pairwise complete.
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Results – Repertoire Models 
  Consistency Complexity 
  Baseline Main Effects Interaction Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Interaction 
 Variables  Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
Management Team Tenure             
Average TMT Tenure (H1)   0.029 *** 0.030 **   0.023 ** 0.022 ** 
   (0.006)  (0.010)    (0.007)  (0.007)  
Std. Dev of TMT Tenure (H2)   0.041 ** 0.041 **   0.052 ** 0.077 *** 
   (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.016)  (0.023)  
Industry Age             
Industry Age 0.002  0.007  0.008  0.016 † 0.023 * 0.032 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Interaction Effects             
Average Tenure x Ind. Age (H3)     (0.000)        
     (0.001)        
SD Tenure x Industry Age (H4)           (0.005) * 
           (0.002)  
Control Variables             
Team Size 0.065 ** 0.049 * 0.049 * 0.030  0.001  (0.006)  
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.027)  
Average TMT Age 0.006  0.006  0.006  0.009  0.010  0.010  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
TMT Age Diversity 0.006  0.005  0.005  0.014  0.009  0.011  
 (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009)  
Prior Repertoire Volume 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.000  0.001 * 0.001 ** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Prior Market Share 0.839 *** 0.704 ** 0.703 ** 0.633 * 0.461 † 0.521 * 
 (0.234)  (0.218)  (0.217)  (0.258)  (0.256)  (0.259)  
Prior Competitive Activity (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm Age 0.005  (0.019) * (0.019) * 0.001  (0.027) ** (0.025) ** 
 (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Publicly Traded (0.169) † (0.144)  (0.147)  0.000  (0.004)  (0.055)  
 (0.095)  (0.099)  (0.102)  (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.106)  
Intercept (0.061)  (0.857)  (0.761)  (0.144)  (1.202)  (1.457)  
 0.478  (0.501)  (0.467)  (0.502)  (0.525)  (0.522)  
n 148  148  148  148  148  148  
R2 0.24  0.37  0.37  0.20  0.30  0.34  
∆R2    0.12 *** 0.00     0.10  ** 0.04 ** 
Comparison model   1a  1b    2a  2b  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 3A 
Summary of Results– Market Share Performance Model (Pooled GLS) 
 Market Share 
 Baseline 
Complexity 
Main Effect 
Consistency 
Main Effects 
Complexity 
Interaction 
Consistency 
Interaction 
Consistency2 
Interaction 
Variables Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e Model 3f 
Competitive Repertoire             
Complexity (H5)   0.043  0.002  0.006  (0.008)  (0.011)  
    (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.036)  
Consistency     0.075 ** 0.064 * 0.094 *** 0.090 ** 
      (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  
Consistency2 (H7)     0.061  0.055  0.056  0.062  
      (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.101)  
Competitive Pressure             
    Competitor Pressure (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) ** (0.000)  (0.000)  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Interaction Effects             
   Complexity x  
   Comp. Pressure (H6) 
      0.000 **     
      (0.000)      
   Consistency x  
   Comp. Pressure 
        (0.000)  0.000  
        (0.000)  (0.000)  
   Consistency2 x   
   Comp. Pressure (H8) 
          (0.000) † 
          (0.000)  
             
Control Variables             
 Industry Age (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 Industry Concentration 0.053  0.145  0.139  0.032  0.123  0.069  
 (0.319)  (0.334)  (0.296)  (0.290)  (0.293)  (0.290)  
 Industry Growth Rate 0.026  0.082  0.172  0.055  0.223  0.231  
 (0.266)  (0.270)  (0.254)  (0.255)  (0.248)  (0.253)  
 Year Founded (0.006) ** (0.006) * (0.005) † (0.007) ** (0.004)  (0.004)  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 Publicly Traded (0.053) * (0.051) * (0.057) ** (0.061) ** (0.062) ** (0.059) ** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
 Firm Size 0.025 * 0.025 * 0.021 * 0.028 *** 0.021 * 0.022 * 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
 Volume 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Intercept 12.571 ** 11.110 * 9.667 † 13.652 * 8.441  8.121  
 (4.586)  (4.801)  (4.909)  (5.176)  (5.092)  (5.277)  
             
n 94  94  94  94  94  94  
R2 0.43  0.44  0.48 † 0.50 * 0.49  0.49  
∆R2    0.010  0.040  0.025  0.006  0.006  
 Comparison model    3a  3b  3c  3c  3e  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 3B 
Summary of Results– Market Share Performance Model (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 
 
Variables 
Market Share 
Baseline 
Complexity 
Main Effect 
Consistency 
Main Effects 
Complexity 
Interaction 
Consistency 
Interaction 
Consistency2 
Interaction 
Model 3g Model 3h Model 3i Model 3j Model 3k Model 3l 
Competitive Repertoire             
Complexity (H5)   0.029 † 0.023  0.019  0.017  0.016  
    (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
Consistency     (0.011)  (0.011)  0.103 † (0.007)  
      (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.060)  (0.017)  
Consistency2 (H7)     0.108 † 0.108 † (0.004)  0.108 † 
      (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.017)  (0.057)  
Competitive Pressure             
  Competitor Pressure (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Interaction Effects             
   Complexity x  
   Comp. Pressure (H6) 
      (0.000)      
      (0.000)      
   Consistency x  
   Comp. Pressure 
        (0.000)  0.000  
        (0.000)  (0.000)  
   Consistency2 x   
   Comp. Pressure (H8) 
          (0.000) ** 
          (0.000)  
             
Control Variables             
 Industry Age 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 Industry Concentration (0.283) * (0.242) † (0.261) † (0.252) † (0.272) * (0.332) * 
 (0.127)  (0.123)  (0.133)  (0.138)  (0.136)  (0.136)  
 Industry Growth Rate 0.049  0.099  0.127  0.134  0.143  0.144  
 (0.174)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (0.175)  (0.170)  
 Year Founded (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 Publicly Traded (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.009)  
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
 Firm Size (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
 Volume 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Prior Market Share 0.928 *** 0.940 *** 0.938 *** 0.939 *** 0.929 *** 0.932 *** 
 (0.061)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.058)  
 Intercept 1.576  0.502  0.330  0.171  0.232  (0.914)  
 (2.460)  (2.529)  (2.706)  (2.867)  (2.699)  (2.825)  
             
n 90  90  90  90  90  90  
R2 0.87  0.88  0.88  0.88  0.88  0.89 † 
∆R2    0.003  0.005  -  0.001  0.006  
Comparison model   3g  3h  3i  3i  3k  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 3C 
Summary of Results – ROA Performance Model (Pooled GLS) 
 ROA 
   Baseline  
 Complexity 
Main Effect 
 Consistency 
Main Effects 
 Complexity 
Interaction  
Consistency 
Interaction 
Consistency2 
Interaction 
 Variables  Model 3m Model 3n Model 3o Model 3p Model 3q Model 3r 
Competitive Repertoire             
 Complexity   0.197 † 0.075  0.083  0.043  0.028  
   (0.108)  (0.105)  (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.101)  
 Consistency     0.308 ** 0.299 * 0.366 ** 0.355 ** 
     (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.120)  (0.125)  
 Consistency2     (0.330)  (0.330)  (0.329)  (0.308)  
     (0.305)  (0.303)  (0.299)  (0.308)  
Competitive Pressure             
 Competitor Volume (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Interaction Effects             
Complexity x 
Competitor Volume 
 
      0.000      
      (0.000)      
Consistency x 
Competitor Volume 
 
        (0.000) † (0.000)  
        (0.000)  (0.000)  
Consistency2 x 
Competitor Volume 
 
          (0.001) † 
          (0.000)  
Control Variables             
Industry Age 0.028 ** 0.025 ** 0.023 ** 0.025 ** 0.022 * 0.022 ** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Industry Concentration 0.317  0.629  0.663  0.587  0.562  0.417  
 (0.837)  (0.847)  (0.776)  (0.770)  (0.743)  (0.711)  
Industry Growth Rate 1.506  1.782  1.927 † 1.838 † 2.122 * 2.178 * 
 (1.075)  (1.091)  (1.038)  (1.061)  (1.035)  (1.046)  
Year Founded (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Publicly Traded (0.092)  (0.110) † (0.126) * (0.130) * (0.149) * (0.139) * 
 (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.064)  
Volume (0.001) ** (0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm Size 0.037  0.044 † 0.048 * 0.050 * 0.047 * 0.047 * 
 (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Intercept 17.054  10.714  8.485  12.559  3.253  3.853  
 (15.665)  (14.258)  (12.807)  (14.869)  (12.413)  (11.738)  
             
n 91  91  91  91  91  91  
R2 0.29  0.32 * 0.38 * 0.38  0.40  0.42  
∆R2   0.032  0.060  0.004  0.020  0.017  
Comparison model    3m  3n  3o  3o  3q  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 3D 
Summary of Results – ROA Performance Model (Dynamic Panel) 
 ROA 
   Baseline  
 Complexity 
Main Effect 
 Consistency 
Main Effects 
 Complexity 
Interaction  
Consistency 
Interaction 
Consistency2 
Interaction 
 Variables    Model 3s  Model 3t  Model 3u   Model 3v  Model 3w  Model 3x 
Competitive Repertoire             
 Complexity   0.097  0.066  0.078  0.026  0.010  
   (0.118)  (0.105)  (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.096)  
 Consistency     0.181  0.183  0.229 † 0.231 † 
     (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.134)  (0.136)  
 Consistency2     (0.336)  (0.346)  (0.298)  (0.274)  
     (0.294)  (0.294)  (0.281)  (0.292)  
Competitive Pressure             
Competitor Volume (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Interaction Effects             
Complexity x 
Competitor Volume 
 
      0.000      
      (0.000)      
Consistency x 
Competitor Volume 
 
        (0.000) † (0.000)  
        (0.000)  (0.000)  
Consistency2 x 
Competitor Volume 
 
          (0.000) † 
          (0.000)  
Control Variables             
Industry Age 0.025 ** 0.024 ** 0.022 ** 0.023 ** 0.021 ** 0.022 ** 
 0.008  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Industry Concentration 0.529  0.644  0.782  0.781  0.713  0.626  
 0.765  (0.768)  (0.787)  (0.780)  (0.803)  (0.790)  
Industry Growth Rate 1.432  1.582  1.644 † 1.592  1.820 † 1.884 † 
 0.916  (0.988)  (0.973)  (0.982)  (0.981)  (0.989)  
Year Founded (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 0.008  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  
Publicly Traded (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.053)  (0.058)  (0.076)  (0.076)  
 0.056  (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.070)  (0.071)  
Volume (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** 
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm Size 0.003  0.011  0.021  0.026  0.016  0.016  
 0.023  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.021)  
Prior ROA 0.542 *** 0.497 *** 0.435 *** 0.424 *** 0.436 *** 0.419 *** 
 0.090  (0.100)  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.112)  (0.113)  
Intercept 11.022  7.964  7.794  9.887  5.128  5.905  
 15.446  (14.106)  (13.550)  (14.721)  (13.211)  (12.707)  
             
n 87  87  87  87  87  87  
R2 0.46  0.47  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.50  
∆R2   0.007  0.016  0.002  0.011  0.007  
Comparison model    3s  3t  3u  3u  3w  
             
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 4A 
Supplemental Analysis – ROA Model (Pooled GLS) Including Yrs. w/ No Actions 
 ROA 
   Baseline  
 Complexity 
Main Effect 
 Consistency 
Main Effects 
 Complexity 
Interaction  
Consistency 
Interaction 
Consistency2 
Interaction 
 Variables  Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d Model 4e Model 4f 
Competitive Repertoire             
 Complexity   0.182 ** 0.040  0.053  0.032  0.027  
   (0.067)  (0.082)  (0.079)  (0.081)  (0.081)  
 Consistency     0.240 * 0.242 ** 0.249 ** 0.243 * 
     (0.093)  (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.097)  
 Consistency2     (0.212)  (0.254)  (0.204)  (0.197)  
     (0.242)  (0.244)  (0.240)  (0.243)  
Competitive Pressure             
 Competitor Volume (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Interaction Effects             
Complexity x 
Competitor Volume 
 
      0.000 †     
      (0.000)      
Consistency x 
Competitor Volume 
 
        (0.000)  0.000  
        (0.000)  (0.000)  
Consistency2 x 
Competitor Volume 
 
          (0.001) † 
          (0.000)  
Control Variables             
Industry Age 0.016 ** 0.015 ** 0.015 ** 0.018 *** 0.014 ** 0.014 ** 
 0.005  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Industry Concentration 0.274  0.312 † 0.326 † 0.309 † 0.326 † 0.310 † 
 0.176  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.174)  (0.178)  (0.175)  
Industry Growth Rate 0.476  0.634  0.633  0.578  0.648  0.676  
 0.545  (0.563)  (0.556)  (0.555)  (0.563)  (0.569)  
Year Founded (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.002) * 
 0.005  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Publicly Traded (0.082) † (0.101) * (0.104) * (0.094) * (0.109) * (0.095) * 
 0.044  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.044)  
Volume (0.001) * (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) *** (0.001) ** (0.001) ** 
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm Size 0.016  0.031 * 0.036 ** 0.034 * 0.038 ** 0.039 ** 
 0.014  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Intercept 10.850  7.628  6.882  14.497  4.925  4.333  
 10.435  (9.126)  (8.347)  (10.383)  (8.433)  (8.270)  
             
n 139  139  139  139  139  139  
R2 0.29  0.32 * 0.38 * 0.38  0.40  0.42  
∆R2   0.032  0.060  0.004  0.020  0.017  
Comparison model    4a  4b  4c  4c  4e  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 4B 
Supplemental Analysis – ROA Model (Dyn. Panel) Including Yrs. w/ No Actions 
 ROA 
   Baseline  
 Complexity 
Main Effect 
 Consistency 
Main Effects 
 Complexity 
Interaction  
Consistency 
Interaction 
Consistency2 
Interaction 
 Variables    Model 4g  Model 4h  Model 4i   Model 4j  Model 4k  Model 4l 
Competitive Repertoire             
 Complexity   0.014 * 0.033  0.047  0.020  0.001  
   (0.007)  (0.088)  (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.084)  
 Consistency     0.132  0.139  0.144  0.153  
     (0.108)  (0.107)  (0.114)  (0.114)  
 Consistency2     (0.253)  (0.286)  (0.233)  (0.213)  
     (0.266)  (0.267)  (0.257)  (0.265)  
Competitive Pressure             
Competitor Volume (0.000)  (0.000) † (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Interaction Effects             
Complexity x 
Competitor Volume 
 
      0.000      
      (0.000)      
Consistency x 
Competitor Volume 
 
        (0.000)  0.000  
        (0.000)  (0.000)  
Consistency2 x 
Competitor Volume 
 
          (0.001) † 
          (0.000)  
Control Variables             
Industry Age 0.014 * 0.000  0.013 * 0.015 * 0.012 * 0.012 * 
 0.005  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Industry Concentration 0.268  0.026  0.274  0.270  0.273  0.267  
 0.164  (0.069)  (0.167)  (0.165)  (0.168)  (0.166)  
Industry Growth Rate 0.546  0.055  0.602  0.557  0.631  0.686  
 0.603  (0.091)  (0.641)  (0.635)  (0.654)  (0.652)  
Year Founded (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002) * 
 0.005  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  
Publicly Traded (0.032)  (0.002)  (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.062)  (0.059) *** 
 0.043  (0.004)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.057)  
Volume (0.001) * 0.000  (0.001) ** (0.001) ** (0.001) * (0.001) * 
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm Size 0.002  (0.001)  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.015  
 0.013  (0.002)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Prior ROA 0.550 *** 0.816 *** 0.467 *** 0.451 *** 0.470 *** 0.450 *** 
 0.083  (0.052)  (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.098)  
Intercept 4.260  0.523  3.990  10.725  1.969  2.961  
 9.687  (0.790)  (8.917)  (11.768)  (9.022)  (8.881)  
             
n 116  116  116  116  116  116  
R2 0.46  0.47  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.50  
∆R2   0.007  0.016  0.002  0.011  0.007  
Comparison model    4a  4b  4c  4c  4e  
             
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 5  
Supplemental Analyses– Alternative Repertoire Models 
  Consistency Complexity 
   Baseline   Main Effects   Interaction   Baseline   Main Effects   Interaction  
 Variables    Model 5a   Model 5b   Model 5c    Model 5d  Model 5e  Model 5f 
Management Team Experience             
Focal Industry Exp. (H1)   0.011 *** 0.025 ***   0.006 ** 0.006 ** 
   (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.002)  (0.002)  
Outside Industry Exp. (H2)   0.000  (0.000)    (0.000)  0.001  
   (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)  
Industry Age             
Industry Age 0.007  0.000  0.014 † 0.018  0.015 † 0.042 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  
Interaction Effects             
Focal Ind. Exp. x Ind. Age (H3)     (0.002) ***       
     (0.000)        
Outside Exp. x Ind. Age (H4)           (0.000) *** 
           (0.000)  
Control Variables             
Average TMT Age 0.011  0.007  0.013  0.012  0.013  0.019 * 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
TMT Age Diversity 0.014  0.008  0.012  0.017  0.017  0.020 * 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
Prior Repertoire Volume 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 *** 0.000  0.000  0.001 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Prior Market Share 0.724 ** 0.689 ** 0.709 *** 0.580  0.531 * 0.731 ** 
 (0.228)  (0.226)  (0.182)  (0.253)  (0.252)  (0.239)  
    Prior Competitive Activity (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000 * (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
    Firm Age 0.000  (0.004)  (0.012) † (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.013)  
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007) † 
    Publicly Traded (0.113)  (0.120)  (0.209) * 0.026  0.031  0.019  
 (0.097)  (0.091)  (0.087)  (0.102)  (0.100)  (0.096)  
    Intercept (0.165)  (0.051)  (0.498)  (0.192)  (0.281)  (0.709)  
    (0.495)  (0.498)  (0.479)  (0.508)  (0.528)  (0.513)  
             
n 148  148  148  148  148  148  
R2 0.24  0.37 *** 0.43 *** 0.20  0.29 *** 0.31 † 
∆R2 (∆df)   0.13 (2)  0.06 (1)    0.09 (2)  0.02 (1)  
Comparison model             
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 6 
Robustness Tests – Firm Fixed Effects Models 
  ROA Market Share 
   Baseline  
 Complexity 
Main Effect 
 Consistency 
Main Effects 
 Baseline  
 Complexity 
Main Effect 
 Consistency 
Main Effects 
 Variables    Model 6a   Model 6b   Model 6c    Model 6d   Model 6e   Model 6f  
Competitive Repertoire             
Complexity (H5)   0.018  (0.082)    0.021  0.011  
    (0.092)  (0.072)    (0.018)  (0.016)  
Consistency      0.659 **     0.032  
      (0.216)      (0.027)  
    Consistency2 (H7)     (1.065) **     (0.012)  
      (0.334)      (0.056)  
Competitive Pressure             
    Competitor Pressure 0.000  0.000  0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
  0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Control Variables             
 Industry Age 0.021 ** 0.020 ** 0.019 *** (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 0.007  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
 Industry Concentration 0.110  0.129  0.244  0.525 *** 0.532 *** 0.532 *** 
 0.529  (0.555)  (0.492)  (0.105)  (0.102)  (0.107)  
 Industry Growth Rate 1.262 * 1.288 * 1.201 * 0.137  0.155  0.159  
 0.580  (0.624)  (0.505)  (0.316)  (0.313)  (0.313)  
 Firm Age 0.024  0.025  0.027  0.000  0.001  0.002  
 0.026  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
 Volume (0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) *** 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 0.000  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
             
n 107  107  107  163  163  163  
R2  0.58  0.59  0.66 *** 0.84  0.84  0.84  
∆R2    0.009  0.066    0.002  0.002  
 Comparison model    6a  6b    6d  6e  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Two-tailed tests are used for all hypotheses. 
† = p <. 10; * = p <. 05; ** = p <. 01; *** = p <. 001 
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TABLE 7A 
Robustness Tests – Joint 3SLS Estimation – Complexity Interaction 
  Mkt. Share ROA Consistency  Complexity 
 Variables    Model 7a   Model 7b   Model 7c    Model 7d 
Management Team Experience         
Average Industry Tenure (H1)     0.052 *** 0.037 *** 
     (0.011)  (0.011)  
SD Tenure (H2)     (0.016)  (0.020)  
     (0.024)  (0.024)  
Industry Age         
Industry Age     (0.011)  0.005  
     (0.011)  (0.012)  
Interaction Effects         
Average Tenure x Ind. Age (H3)     (0.004) **   
     (0.001)    
SD Tenure x Ind. Age (H4)       (0.003) † 
       (0.002)  
Competitive Repertoire         
Complexity (H5) (0.038)  0.039      
  (0.177)  (0.029)      
Consistency          
          
Consistency2 (H7)         
          
Competitive Pressure         
    Competitor Pressure (0.001)  (0.001)      
 (0.000)  0.000      
Interaction Effects         
   Complexity x  
   Comp. Pressure (H6) 
(0.001)  0.001      
(0.000)  (0.000)      
   Consistency x  
   Comp. Pressure 
        
        
   Consistency2 x   
   Comp. Pressure (H8) 
        
        
Control Variables Same as pooled panel models, with individual action controls 
LR test – Add H5 and H6 (df) 2.19(2)  8.85(2) *     
n 88  88  88  88  
R2 .061     -.126  .507  .397  
Correlations between residuals MS ROA Complexity Consistency 
MS     
ROA .59    
Consistency (.22) (.23)   
Complexity (.40) (.50) .25  
Repertoire variables predicted in first stage, with non-overlapping variables used as instruments.  For ROA, the hypothesis of weak instruments is 
rejected for both the main effect (F(13,66)=3.108, p < .01), and interaction term (F(13,66)=3.800, p <. 01).  The Wu-Hausman test is not rejected.  
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TABLE 7B 
Robustness Tests – Joint 3SLS Estimation – Consistency Interaction 
  Mkt. Share ROA Consistency  Complexity 
 Variables    Model 7e   Model 7f  Model 7g   Model 7h 
Management Team Experience         
Average Industry Tenure (H1)     0.051 *** 0.038 ** 
     (0.011)  (0.012)  
SD Tenure (H2)     (0.015)  (0.021)  
     (0.024)  (0.025)  
Industry Age         
Industry Age     (0.001)  0.001  
     (0.011)  (0.012)  
Interaction Effects         
Average Tenure x Ind. Age (H3)     (0.003) *   
     (0.001)    
SD Tenure x Ind. Age (H4)       (0.003)  
       (0.002)  
Competitive Repertoire         
Complexity (H5) (0.045)  (1.300)      
  (0.040)  (1.401)      
Consistency (H7) 1.155  2.251      
  (1.681)  (2.920)      
Consistency2 (H7) (0.068)  (1.252)      
  (1.563)  (2.983)      
Competitive Pressure         
    Competitor Pressure 0.000  (0.000)      
 (0.000)  (0.000)      
Interaction Effects         
   Consistency x  
   Comp. Pressure 
(0.001)  0.002      
(0.001)  (0.004)      
   Consistency2 x   
   Comp. Pressure (H8) 
0.001  (0.003)      
(0.002)  (0.005)      
Control Variables Same as pooled panel models, with individual action controls 
LR test – Add H7 and H8 (df) 29.6 (4) *** 18.18(4) **     
n 88  88  88  88  
R2 -.57 *** -1.93 *** .505 *** .395 *** 
Correlations between residuals MS ROA Complexity Consistency 
MS     
ROA .37    
Consistency (.45) (.30)   
Complexity .33 .49 .26  
Repertoire variables predicted in first stage, with non-overlapping variables used as instruments.  For ROA, the hypothesis of weak instruments is 
rejected for both the main effects and interaction terms (F(13,66)={3.23–5.42, p <.01). The Wu-Hausman test is marginal (F(4,68)=2.32, p < .10).  
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TABLE 8 
Summary of Results 
DV: Consistency Complexity MS ROA ROA Multiple ROA MS Multiple Multiple 
Method: OLS OLS OLS / DPD OLS / DPD OLS / DPD OLS FE FE 3SLS 3SLS 
Independent 
Variables: 
Avg, SD 
Tenure, 
Interactions 
Avg, SD 
Tenure, 
Interactions 
Consistency, 
Complexity, 
Interactions 
Consistency, 
Complexity, 
Interactions 
Consistency, 
Complexity, 
Interactions 
Focal and 
Outside Ind. 
Experience 
Consistency, 
Complexity 
Consistency, 
Complexity 
Avg, SD 
Tenure, 
Interactions 
Avg, SD 
Tenure, 
Interactions 
Endogenous 
Variables:         
Consistency, 
Complexity 
Consistency, 
Complexity 
 Hypothesis   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3a-l   Model 3m-x   Model 4a-l   Model 5   Model 6a-c   Models 6d-f   Model 7A   Model 7B  
H1 Yes     Yes   Yes Yes 
H2  Yes    No   No No 
H3 No     Yes   Yes Yes 
H4  Opposite    Opposite   Opposite No 
H5   No, Marginal Marginal, No Yes, Yes  No No   
H6   Yes, No No, No Marginal, No    No, Yes  
H7   No, Opposite  No, No No, No  Yes No   
H8   Marginal, Yes 
Marginal, 
Marginal Marginal, No     Opposite, Yes 
           
Notes           
For models 3a-x, results reported related to the pooled panel model, and the dynamic panel model, respectively.  
For models 4a-l, additional observations were incorporated for firm-years where no actions were observed, but actions were observable (i.e., these firm-year observations occur in 
periods between available observations and where performance data is available. 
For models 7A and 7B, the reported support for H6 and H8 relate to market share and return on assets, respectively.  Support for the interaction based on a likelihood ratio test for 
both coefficients simultaneously, thus support is listed for the interaction hypotheses (H6, H8) only.   
In model 7B, the market share results are significant but the second order term is of the opposite sign. 
Effects are only considered to be significant if: for Models 1 – 6, the Wald test of their individual coefficient is significant at p < .05 or less, and for Models 7AB, if the likelihood 
ratio test is significant at p < .05 or less.  To aid the reader, while not considered significant, effects with p < .10 are labeled as ‘marginal’.  Significant effects of opposite sign (at 
p < .10 or less) are labeled ‘opposite’. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A – Sampling Frame 
ID Company Name Year 
Actions 
(> 1 / year) 
TMT ROA 
TMT-
Action 
Action-MS 
Action-
Perf. 
Full Model 
Count   273 303 221 195 210 192 165 
1 3D Systems 1988 x x  Y Y N N 
97 3D Systems 1989 x x  Y Y N N 
193 3D Systems 1990 x x  Y Y N N 
289 3D Systems 1991 x x x Y Y Y Y 
385 3D Systems 1992 x x x Y Y Y Y 
481 3D Systems 1993 x x x Y Y Y Y 
577 3D Systems 1994 x x x Y Y Y Y 
673 3D Systems 1995 x x x Y Y Y Y 
769 3D Systems 1996 x x x Y Y Y Y 
865 3D Systems 1997 x x x Y Y Y Y 
961 3D Systems 1998 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1057 3D Systems 1999 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1153 3D Systems 2000 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1249 3D Systems 2001 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1345 3D Systems 2002 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1441 3D Systems 2003 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1537 3D Systems 2004 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1633 3D Systems 2005 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1729 3D Systems 2006 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1825 3D Systems 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1921 3D Systems 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2017 3D Systems 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2113 3D Systems 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2209 3D Systems 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2305 3D Systems 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2401 3D Systems 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2497 3D Systems 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2593 3D Systems 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2498 3DCeram 2014    N N N N 
2594 3DCeram 2015    N N N N 
1827 Accufusion 2007    N N N N 
1923 Accufusion 2008    N N N N 
2019 Accufusion 2009    N N N N 
2596 Additive Industries 2015    N N N N 
2597 Alkimat 2015    N N N N 
2502 Arburg 2014    N N N N 
2598 Arburg 2015    N N N N 
1255 Arcam 2001 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1351 Arcam 2002 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1447 Arcam 2003 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1543 Arcam 2004 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1639 Arcam 2005 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1735 Arcam 2006 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1831 Arcam 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1927 Arcam 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2023 Arcam 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2119 Arcam 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2215 Arcam 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2311 Arcam 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2407 Arcam 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2503 Arcam 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2599 Arcam 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2312 Asiga 2012    N N N N 
2408 Asiga 2013    N N N N 
2504 Asiga 2014    N N N N 
2600 Asiga 2015    N N N N 
1737 Aspect 2006    N N N N 
1833 Aspect 2007    N N N N 
1929 Aspect 2008    N N N N 
2025 Aspect 2009    N N N N 
2121 Aspect 2010    N N N N 
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2217 Aspect 2011    N N N N 
2313 Aspect 2012    N N N N 
2409 Aspect 2013    N N N N 
2505 Aspect 2014    N N N N 
2601 Aspect 2015    N N N N 
970 Autostrade 1998    N N N N 
1066 Autostrade 1999    N N N N 
1162 Autostrade 2000    N N N N 
1258 Autostrade 2001    N N N N 
1354 Autostrade 2002    N N N N 
1450 Autostrade 2003    N N N N 
1546 Autostrade 2004    N N N N 
1642 Autostrade 2005    N N N N 
1738 Autostrade 2006    N N N N 
1834 Autostrade 2007    N N N N 
1930 Autostrade 2008    N N N N 
2027 BeAM 2009    N N N N 
2123 BeAM 2010    N N N N 
2219 BeAM 2011    N N N N 
2315 BeAM 2012    N N N N 
2411 BeAM 2013    N N N N 
2507 BeAM 2014    N N N N 
2603 BeAM 2015    N N N N 
2604 Beijing EPlus 3D 2015    N N N N 
781 Beijing Long Yuan 1996    N N N N 
877 Beijing Long Yuan 1997    N N N N 
973 Beijing Long Yuan 1998    N N N N 
1069 Beijing Long Yuan 1999    N N N N 
1165 Beijing Long Yuan 2000    N N N N 
1261 Beijing Long Yuan 2001    N N N N 
1357 Beijing Long Yuan 2002    N N N N 
1453 Beijing Long Yuan 2003    N N N N 
1549 Beijing Long Yuan 2004    N N N N 
1645 Beijing Long Yuan 2005    N N N N 
1741 Beijing Long Yuan 2006    N N N N 
1837 Beijing Long Yuan 2007    N N N N 
1933 Beijing Long Yuan 2008    N N N N 
2029 Beijing Long Yuan 2009    N N N N 
2125 Beijing Long Yuan 2010    N N N N 
2221 Beijing Long Yuan 2011    N N N N 
2317 Beijing Long Yuan 2012    N N N N 
2413 Beijing Long Yuan 2013    N N N N 
2509 Beijing Long Yuan 2014    N N N N 
2605 Beijing Long Yuan 2015    N N N N 
782 Beijing Tiertime 1996    N N N N 
878 Beijing Tiertime 1997    N N N N 
974 Beijing Tiertime 1998    N N N N 
1070 Beijing Tiertime 1999    N N N N 
1166 Beijing Tiertime 2000    N N N N 
1262 Beijing Tiertime 2001    N N N N 
1358 Beijing Tiertime 2002    N N N N 
1454 Beijing Tiertime 2003    N N N N 
1550 Beijing Tiertime 2004    N N N N 
1646 Beijing Tiertime 2005    N N N N 
1742 Beijing Tiertime 2006    N N N N 
1838 Beijing Tiertime 2007    N N N N 
1934 Beijing Tiertime 2008    N N N N 
2030 Beijing Tiertime 2009    N N N N 
2126 Beijing Tiertime 2010    N N N N 
2222 Beijing Tiertime 2011    N N N N 
2318 Beijing Tiertime 2012    N N N N 
2414 Beijing Tiertime 2013    N N N N 
2510 Beijing Tiertime 2014    N N N N 
2606 Beijing Tiertime 2015    N N N N 
2415 BigRep 2013    N N N N 
2511 BigRep 2014    N N N N 
2607 BigRep 2015    N N N N 
2416 Blueprinter 2013    N N N N 
2512 Blueprinter 2014    N N N N 
2608 Blueprinter 2015    N N N N 
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2033 Carima 2009    N N N N 
2129 Carima 2010    N N N N 
2225 Carima 2011    N N N N 
2321 Carima 2012    N N N N 
2417 Carima 2013    N N N N 
2513 Carima 2014    N N N N 
2609 Carima 2015    N N N N 
1458 Chubunippon 2003    N N N N 
1554 Chubunippon 2004    N N N N 
1650 Chubunippon 2005    N N N N 
1746 Chubunippon 2006    N N N N 
1842 Chubunippon 2007    N N N N 
1938 Chubunippon 2008    N N N N 
403 CMET 1992    N N N N 
499 CMET 1993    N N N N 
595 CMET 1994    N N N N 
691 CMET 1995    N N N N 
787 CMET 1996    N N N N 
883 CMET 1997    N N N N 
979 CMET 1998    N N N N 
1075 CMET 1999    N N N N 
1171 CMET 2000    N N N N 
1267 CMET 2001    N N N N 
1363 CMET 2002    N N N N 
1459 CMET 2003    N N N N 
1555 CMET 2004    N N N N 
1651 CMET 2005    N N N N 
1747 CMET 2006  x  N N N N 
1843 CMET 2007  x  N N N N 
1939 CMET 2008  x  N N N N 
2035 CMET 2009  x  N N N N 
2131 CMET 2010  x  N N N N 
2227 CMET 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2323 CMET 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2419 CMET 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2515 CMET 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2611 CMET 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2715 CMET 2015 x   N Y N N 
1364 Concept Laser 2002  x  N N N N 
1460 Concept Laser 2003  x  N N N N 
1556 Concept Laser 2004 x x  Y Y N N 
1652 Concept Laser 2005 x x  Y Y N N 
1748 Concept Laser 2006  x  N N N N 
1844 Concept Laser 2007 x x  Y Y N N 
1940 Concept Laser 2008 x x  Y Y N N 
2036 Concept Laser 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2132 Concept Laser 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2228 Concept Laser 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2324 Concept Laser 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2420 Concept Laser 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2516 Concept Laser 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2612 Concept Laser 2015 x x  Y Y N N 
1269 Cubic Technologies 2001    N N N N 
1365 Cubic Technologies 2002    N N N N 
1461 Cubic Technologies 2003    N N N N 
1557 Cubic Technologies 2004    N N N N 
1653 Cubic Technologies 2005    N N N N 
1749 Cubic Technologies 2006    N N N N 
1845 Cubic Technologies 2007    N N N N 
310 Cubital 1991    N N N N 
406 Cubital 1992    N N N N 
502 Cubital 1993    N N N N 
598 Cubital 1994    N N N N 
694 Cubital 1995    N N N N 
790 Cubital 1996    N N N N 
886 Cubital 1997    N N N N 
982 Cubital 1998    N N N N 
407 Denken 1992    N N N N 
503 Denken 1993    N N N N 
599 Denken 1994    N N N N 
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695 Denken 1995    N N N N 
791 Denken 1996    N N N N 
887 Denken 1997    N N N N 
983 Denken 1998    N N N N 
1079 Denken 1999    N N N N 
1175 Denken 2000    N N N N 
1271 Denken 2001    N N N N 
1367 Denken 2002    N N N N 
1463 Denken 2003    N N N N 
1559 Denken 2004    N N N N 
1655 Denken 2005    N N N N 
1751 Denken 2006    N N N N 
1847 Denken 2007    N N N N 
1943 Denken 2008    N N N N 
120 D-MEC 1989    N N N N 
216 D-MEC 1990   x N N N N 
312 D-MEC 1991   x N N N N 
408 D-MEC 1992   x N N N N 
504 D-MEC 1993   x N N N N 
600 D-MEC 1994   x N N N N 
696 D-MEC 1995   x N N N N 
792 D-MEC 1996   x N N N N 
888 D-MEC 1997   x N N N N 
984 D-MEC 1998   x N N N N 
1080 D-MEC 1999   x N N N N 
1176 D-MEC 2000   x N N N N 
1272 D-MEC 2001   x N N N N 
1368 D-MEC 2002   x N N N N 
1464 D-MEC 2003   x N N N N 
1560 D-MEC 2004   x N N N N 
1656 D-MEC 2005   x N N N N 
1752 D-MEC 2006   x N N N N 
1848 D-MEC 2007   x N N N N 
1944 D-MEC 2008   x N N N N 
2040 D-MEC 2009   x N N N N 
2136 D-MEC 2010   x N N N N 
2232 D-MEC 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2328 D-MEC 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2424 D-MEC 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2520 D-MEC 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2616 D-MEC 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2521 DMG Mori Seiki 2014    N N N N 
2617 DMG Mori Seiki 2015    N N N N 
2522 DO3D 2014    N N N N 
2618 DO3D 2015    N N N N 
411 DTM 1992 x x x Y Y Y Y 
507 DTM 1993 x x x Y Y Y Y 
603 DTM 1994 x x x Y Y Y Y 
699 DTM 1995 x x x Y Y Y Y 
795 DTM 1996 x x x Y Y Y Y 
891 DTM 1997 x x x Y Y Y Y 
987 DTM 1998 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1083 DTM 1999 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1179 DTM 2000 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1275 DTM 2001 x   N Y N N 
1660 DWS 2005    N N N N 
1756 DWS 2006    N N N N 
1852 DWS 2007    N N N N 
1948 DWS 2008    N N N N 
2044 DWS 2009    N N N N 
2140 DWS 2010    N N N N 
2236 DWS 2011   x N N N N 
2332 DWS 2012   x N N N N 
2428 DWS 2013   x N N N N 
2524 DWS 2014 x   N Y N N 
2620 DWS 2015 x   N Y N N 
1373 Envisiontec 2002  x  N N N N 
1469 Envisiontec 2003 x x  Y Y N N 
1565 Envisiontec 2004 x x  Y Y N N 
1661 Envisiontec 2005 x x  Y Y N N 
Top Management Team Tenure, Competitive Repertoires, and Firm Performance in the 3D Printing Industry (1988 – 2015)  
101 
1757 Envisiontec 2006 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1853 Envisiontec 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1949 Envisiontec 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2045 Envisiontec 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2141 Envisiontec 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2237 Envisiontec 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2333 Envisiontec 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2429 Envisiontec 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2525 Envisiontec 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2621 Envisiontec 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
222 EOS 1990  x  N N N N 
318 EOS 1991  x  N N N N 
414 EOS 1992  x  N N N N 
510 EOS 1993  x  N N N N 
606 EOS 1994  x  N N N N 
702 EOS 1995  x  N N N N 
798 EOS 1996  x  N N N N 
894 EOS 1997  x  N N N N 
990 EOS 1998  x  N N N N 
1086 EOS 1999  x  N N N N 
1182 EOS 2000  x  N N N N 
1278 EOS 2001  x  N N N N 
1374 EOS 2002  x  N N N N 
1470 EOS 2003  x  N N N N 
1566 EOS 2004  x  N N N N 
1662 EOS 2005 x x  Y Y N N 
1758 EOS 2006 x x  Y Y N N 
1854 EOS 2007 x x  Y Y N N 
1950 EOS 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2046 EOS 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2142 EOS 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2238 EOS 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2334 EOS 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2430 EOS 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2526 EOS 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2622 EOS 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1279 ExOne 2001    N N N N 
1375 ExOne 2002    N N N N 
1471 ExOne 2003    N N N N 
2335 ExOne 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2431 ExOne 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1567 ExOne 2004    N N N N 
2527 ExOne 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2623 ExOne 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1663 ExOne 2005    N N N N 
1759 ExOne 2006    N N N N 
1855 ExOne 2007    N N N N 
1951 ExOne 2008    N N N N 
2047 ExOne 2009    N N N N 
2143 ExOne 2010   x N N N N 
2239 ExOne 2011   x N N N N 
608 F&S GmbH 1994    N N N N 
704 F&S GmbH 1995    N N N N 
800 F&S GmbH 1996    N N N N 
896 F&S GmbH 1997    N N N N 
992 F&S GmbH 1998    N N N N 
1088 F&S GmbH 1999    N N N N 
1184 F&S GmbH 2000    N N N N 
1280 F&S GmbH 2001    N N N N 
1376 F&S GmbH 2002    N N N N 
1472 F&S GmbH 2003    N N N N 
2241 Fabrisonic 2011    N N N N 
2337 Fabrisonic 2012    N N N N 
2433 Fabrisonic 2013    N N N N 
2529 Fabrisonic 2014    N N N N 
2625 Fabrisonic 2015    N N N N 
1378 Generis 2002    N N N N 
1474 Generis 2003    N N N N 
2627 German RepRap 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
420 Helisys 1992  x  N N N N 
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516 Helisys 1993  x  N N N N 
612 Helisys 1994  x  N N N N 
708 Helisys 1995 x x x Y Y Y Y 
804 Helisys 1996 x x x Y Y Y Y 
900 Helisys 1997 x x x Y Y Y Y 
996 Helisys 1998 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1092 Helisys 1999 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1188 Helisys 2000 x x  Y Y N N 
2341 Hunan Farsoon 2012    N N N N 
2437 Hunan Farsoon 2013    N N N N 
2533 Hunan Farsoon 2014    N N N N 
2629 Hunan Farsoon 2015    N N N N 
2054 Huntsman 2009    N N N N 
2150 Huntsman 2010    N N N N 
2631 Indmatec 2015    N N N N 
2344 
Innovation 
MediTech 2012    N N N N 
2440 
Innovation 
MediTech 2013    N N N N 
2249 InssTek 2011    N N N N 
2345 InssTek 2012    N N N N 
2441 InssTek 2013    N N N N 
2537 InssTek 2014    N N N N 
2633 InssTek 2015    N N N N 
2346 Keyence 2012    N N N N 
2442 Keyence 2013    N N N N 
2538 Keyence 2014    N N N N 
2634 Keyence 2015    N N N N 
715 Kinergy 1995    N N N N 
811 Kinergy 1996    N N N N 
907 Kinergy 1997    N N N N 
1003 Kinergy 1998    N N N N 
1099 Kinergy 1999    N N N N 
1195 Kinergy 2000    N N N N 
1291 Kinergy 2001    N N N N 
1387 Kinergy 2002    N N N N 
1483 Kinergy 2003    N N N N 
620 Kira 1994    N N N N 
716 Kira 1995    N N N N 
812 Kira 1996    N N N N 
908 Kira 1997    N N N N 
1004 Kira 1998    N N N N 
1100 Kira 1999    N N N N 
1196 Kira 2000    N N N N 
1292 Kira 2001    N N N N 
1388 Kira 2002    N N N N 
1484 Kira 2003    N N N N 
1580 Kira 2004    N N N N 
1676 Kira 2005    N N N N 
1772 Kira 2006    N N N N 
1868 Kira 2007    N N N N 
1964 Kira 2008    N N N N 
2060 Kira 2009    N N N N 
2156 Kira 2010    N N N N 
2253 Lithoz 2011    N N N N 
2349 Lithoz 2012    N N N N 
2445 Lithoz 2013    N N N N 
2541 Lithoz 2014    N N N N 
2637 Lithoz 2015    N N N N 
2542 MarkForged 2014    N N N N 
2638 MarkForged 2015    N N N N 
2351 Matsuura 2012    N N N N 
2447 Matsuura 2013    N N N N 
2543 Matsuura 2014    N N N N 
2639 Matsuura 2015    N N N N 
1968 Mcor 2008    N N N N 
2064 Mcor 2009    N N N N 
2160 Mcor 2010    N N N N 
2256 Mcor 2011    N N N N 
2352 Mcor 2012    N N N N 
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2448 Mcor 2013    N N N N 
2544 Mcor 2014    N N N N 
2640 Mcor 2015    N N N N 
625 Meiko 1994    N N N N 
721 Meiko 1995    N N N N 
817 Meiko 1996    N N N N 
913 Meiko 1997    N N N N 
1009 Meiko 1998    N N N N 
1105 Meiko 1999    N N N N 
1201 Meiko 2000    N N N N 
1297 Meiko 2001    N N N N 
1393 Meiko 2002    N N N N 
1489 Meiko 2003    N N N N 
1585 Meiko 2004    N N N N 
1681 Meiko 2005    N N N N 
1777 Meiko 2006    N N N N 
1394 Menix 2002    N N N N 
1490 Menix 2003    N N N N 
1586 Menix 2004    N N N N 
1682 Menix 2005    N N N N 
1778 Menix 2006    N N N N 
1874 Menix 2007    N N N N 
1970 Menix 2008    N N N N 
627 MTT Technologies 1994  x  N N N N 
723 MTT Technologies 1995  x  N N N N 
819 MTT Technologies 1996  x  N N N N 
915 MTT Technologies 1997  x  N N N N 
1011 MTT Technologies 1998  x  N N N N 
1107 MTT Technologies 1999  x  N N N N 
1203 MTT Technologies 2000 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1299 MTT Technologies 2001 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1395 MTT Technologies 2002 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1491 MTT Technologies 2003 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1587 MTT Technologies 2004 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1683 MTT Technologies 2005 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1779 MTT Technologies 2006 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1875 MTT Technologies 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1971 MTT Technologies 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2067 MTT Technologies 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2163 MTT Technologies 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1972 Nanoscribe 2008    N N N N 
2068 Nanoscribe 2009    N N N N 
2164 Nanoscribe 2010    N N N N 
2260 Nanoscribe 2011    N N N N 
2356 Nanoscribe 2012    N N N N 
2452 Nanoscribe 2013    N N N N 
2548 Nanoscribe 2014    N N N N 
2644 Nanoscribe 2015    N N N N 
53 NTT Data CMET 1988    N N N N 
149 NTT Data CMET 1989    N N N N 
245 NTT Data CMET 1990    N N N N 
341 NTT Data CMET 1991    N N N N 
437 NTT Data CMET 1992    N N N N 
533 NTT Data CMET 1993    N N N N 
629 NTT Data CMET 1994    N N N N 
725 NTT Data CMET 1995    N N N N 
821 NTT Data CMET 1996    N N N N 
917 NTT Data CMET 1997    N N N N 
1013 NTT Data CMET 1998    N N N N 
1109 NTT Data CMET 1999    N N N N 
1205 NTT Data CMET 2000    N N N N 
1206 Objet 2000  x  N N N N 
1302 Objet 2001  x  N N N N 
1398 Objet 2002  x  N N N N 
1494 Objet 2003  x  N N N N 
1590 Objet 2004  x  N N N N 
1686 Objet 2005  x  N N N N 
1782 Objet 2006  x  N N N N 
1878 Objet 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1974 Objet 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
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2070 Objet 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2166 Objet 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2262 Objet 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2358 Objet 2012 x   N Y N N 
2551 OPM Lab 2014    N N N N 
2647 OPM Lab 2015    N N N N 
1016 Optomec 1998    N N N N 
1112 Optomec 1999  x  N N N N 
1208 Optomec 2000  x  N N N N 
1304 Optomec 2001  x  N N N N 
1400 Optomec 2002  x  N N N N 
1496 Optomec 2003  x  N N N N 
1592 Optomec 2004  x  N N N N 
1688 Optomec 2005  x  N N N N 
1784 Optomec 2006  x  N N N N 
1880 Optomec 2007  x  N N N N 
1976 Optomec 2008 x x  Y Y N N 
2072 Optomec 2009 x x  Y Y N N 
2168 Optomec 2010 x x  Y Y N N 
2264 Optomec 2011 x x  Y Y N N 
2360 Optomec 2012 x x  Y Y N N 
2456 Optomec 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2552 Optomec 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2648 Optomec 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
345 Other 1991    N N N N 
441 Other 1992    N N N N 
537 Other 1993    N N N N 
633 Other 1994    N N N N 
729 Other 1995    N N N N 
825 Other 1996    N N N N 
921 Other 1997    N N N N 
1017 Other 1998    N N N N 
1113 Other 1999    N N N N 
1209 Other 2000    N N N N 
1305 Other 2001    N N N N 
1401 Other 2002    N N N N 
1402 Phenix Systems 2002    N N N N 
1498 Phenix Systems 2003    N N N N 
1594 Phenix Systems 2004    N N N N 
1690 Phenix Systems 2005    N N N N 
1786 Phenix Systems 2006    N N N N 
1882 Phenix Systems 2007    N N N N 
1978 Phenix Systems 2008    N N N N 
2074 Phenix Systems 2009    N N N N 
2170 Phenix Systems 2010    N N N N 
2266 Phenix Systems 2011   x N N N N 
2362 Phenix Systems 2012 x  x N Y Y N 
2458 Phenix Systems 2013 x  x N Y Y N 
1499 POM 2003    N N N N 
1595 POM 2004    N N N N 
1691 POM 2005    N N N N 
1787 POM 2006    N N N N 
1883 POM 2007    N N N N 
1979 POM 2008    N N N N 
2075 POM 2009    N N N N 
2171 POM 2010    N N N N 
2172 Prodways 2010    N N N N 
2268 Prodways 2011    N N N N 
2364 Prodways 2012    N N N N 
2460 Prodways 2013    N N N N 
2556 Prodways 2014    N N N N 
2652 Prodways 2015    N N N N 
2269 Rapid Shape 2011    N N N N 
2365 Rapid Shape 2012    N N N N 
2461 Rapid Shape 2013    N N N N 
2557 Rapid Shape 2014    N N N N 
2653 Rapid Shape 2015    N N N N 
2078 ReaLizer 2009    N N N N 
2174 ReaLizer 2010    N N N N 
2270 ReaLizer 2011    N N N N 
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2366 ReaLizer 2012    N N N N 
2462 ReaLizer 2013    N N N N 
2558 ReaLizer 2014    N N N N 
2654 ReaLizer 2015    N N N N 
2271 Renishaw 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2367 Renishaw 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2463 Renishaw 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2559 Renishaw 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2655 Renishaw 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1120 Röders 1999    N N N N 
2657 Rokit 2015    N N N N 
2562 Roland DG 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2658 Roland DG 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2659 RPMI 2015    N N N N 
1316 Sanders Design Int'l 2001    N N N N 
1412 Sanders Design Int'l 2002    N N N N 
1508 Sanders Design Int'l 2003    N N N N 
1604 Sanders Design Int'l 2004    N N N N 
837 Schroff 1996    N N N N 
933 Schroff 1997    N N N N 
1029 Schroff 1998    N N N N 
1125 Schroff 1999    N N N N 
1221 Schroff 2000    N N N N 
1317 Schroff 2001    N N N N 
2278 Sciaky 2011    N N N N 
2374 Sciaky 2012    N N N N 
2470 Sciaky 2013    N N N N 
2566 Sciaky 2014    N N N N 
2662 Sciaky 2015    N N N N 
2663 Sentrol 2015    N N N N 
936 Shaanxi Hengtong 1997    N N N N 
1032 Shaanxi Hengtong 1998    N N N N 
1128 Shaanxi Hengtong 1999    N N N N 
1224 Shaanxi Hengtong 2000    N N N N 
1320 Shaanxi Hengtong 2001    N N N N 
1416 Shaanxi Hengtong 2002    N N N N 
1512 Shaanxi Hengtong 2003    N N N N 
1608 Shaanxi Hengtong 2004    N N N N 
1704 Shaanxi Hengtong 2005    N N N N 
1800 Shaanxi Hengtong 2006    N N N N 
1896 Shaanxi Hengtong 2007    N N N N 
1992 Shaanxi Hengtong 2008    N N N N 
2088 Shaanxi Hengtong 2009    N N N N 
2184 Shaanxi Hengtong 2010    N N N N 
2280 Shaanxi Hengtong 2011    N N N N 
2376 Shaanxi Hengtong 2012    N N N N 
2472 Shaanxi Hengtong 2013    N N N N 
2568 Shaanxi Hengtong 2014    N N N N 
2664 Shaanxi Hengtong 2015    N N N N 
1321 Shanghai Union  2001    N N N N 
1417 Shanghai Union  2002    N N N N 
1513 Shanghai Union  2003    N N N N 
1609 Shanghai Union  2004    N N N N 
1705 Shanghai Union  2005    N N N N 
1801 Shanghai Union  2006    N N N N 
1897 Shanghai Union  2007    N N N N 
1993 Shanghai Union  2008    N N N N 
2089 Shanghai Union  2009    N N N N 
2185 Shanghai Union  2010    N N N N 
2281 Shanghai Union  2011    N N N N 
2377 Shanghai Union  2012    N N N N 
2473 Shanghai Union  2013    N N N N 
2569 Shanghai Union  2014    N N N N 
2665 Shanghai Union  2015    N N N N 
2666 Sharebot 2015    N N N N 
2667 Sinterit 2015    N N N N 
1804 Sintermask 2006    N N N N 
1900 Sintermask 2007    N N N N 
1996 Sintermask 2008    N N N N 
2573 Sisma 2014    N N N N 
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2669 Sisma 2015    N N N N 
2286 SLM Solutions 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2382 SLM Solutions 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2478 SLM Solutions 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2574 SLM Solutions 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2670 SLM Solutions 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1327 Solidica 2001    N N N N 
1423 Solidica 2002    N N N N 
1519 Solidica 2003    N N N N 
1615 Solidica 2004    N N N N 
1711 Solidica 2005    N N N N 
1807 Solidica 2006    N N N N 
1903 Solidica 2007    N N N N 
1999 Solidica 2008    N N N N 
2095 Solidica 2009    N N N N 
2191 Solidica 2010    N N N N 
1616 Solido 2004    N N N N 
1712 Solido 2005    N N N N 
1808 Solido 2006    N N N N 
1904 Solido 2007    N N N N 
2000 Solido 2008    N N N N 
2096 Solido 2009    N N N N 
2192 Solido 2010    N N N N 
657 Solidscape 1994    N N N N 
753 Solidscape 1995    N N N N 
849 Solidscape 1996    N N N N 
945 Solidscape 1997 x   N Y N N 
1041 Solidscape 1998    N N N N 
1137 Solidscape 1999    N N N N 
1233 Solidscape 2000 x   N Y N N 
1329 Solidscape 2001 x   N Y N N 
1425 Solidscape 2002    N N N N 
1521 Solidscape 2003    N N N N 
1617 Solidscape 2004    N N N N 
1713 Solidscape 2005    N N N N 
1809 Solidscape 2006    N N N N 
1905 Solidscape 2007    N N N N 
2001 Solidscape 2008    N N N N 
2097 Solidscape 2009 x   N Y N N 
2193 Solidscape 2010 x  x N Y Y N 
2289 Solidscape 2011 x  x N Y Y N 
2385 Solidscape 2012 x   N Y N N 
370 Stratasys 1991    N N N N 
466 Stratasys 1992    N N N N 
562 Stratasys 1993    N N N N 
658 Stratasys 1994 x x x Y Y Y Y 
754 Stratasys 1995 x x x Y Y Y Y 
850 Stratasys 1996 x x x Y Y Y Y 
946 Stratasys 1997 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1042 Stratasys 1998 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1138 Stratasys 1999 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1234 Stratasys 2000 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1330 Stratasys 2001 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1426 Stratasys 2002 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1522 Stratasys 2003 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1618 Stratasys 2004 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1714 Stratasys 2005 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1810 Stratasys 2006 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1906 Stratasys 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2002 Stratasys 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2098 Stratasys 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2194 Stratasys 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2290 Stratasys 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2386 Stratasys 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2482 Stratasys 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2578 Stratasys 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2674 Stratasys 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2483 Stratasys Ltd. 2013    N N N N 
2676 Structo 2015    N N N N 
2677 Titan Robotics 2015    N N N N 
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2390 Trump Precision  2012    N N N N 
2486 Trump Precision  2013    N N N N 
2582 Trump Precision  2014    N N N N 
2678 Trump Precision  2015    N N N N 
1623 Trumpf 2004 x   N Y N N 
1719 Trumpf 2005 x x  Y Y N N 
1815 Trumpf 2006 x x  Y Y N N 
1911 Trumpf 2007 x x  Y Y N N 
2007 Trumpf 2008 x x  Y Y N N 
2103 Trumpf 2009 x x  Y Y N N 
2199 Trumpf 2010 x x  Y Y N N 
2295 Trumpf 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2391 Trumpf 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2487 Trumpf 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2583 Trumpf 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2679 Trumpf 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
760 Unirapid 1995    N N N N 
856 Unirapid 1996    N N N N 
952 Unirapid 1997    N N N N 
1048 Unirapid 1998    N N N N 
1144 Unirapid 1999    N N N N 
1240 Unirapid 2000    N N N N 
1336 Unirapid 2001    N N N N 
1432 Unirapid 2002    N N N N 
1528 Unirapid 2003    N N N N 
1624 Unirapid 2004    N N N N 
1720 Unirapid 2005    N N N N 
1816 Unirapid 2006    N N N N 
1912 Unirapid 2007    N N N N 
2008 Unirapid 2008    N N N N 
2104 Unirapid 2009    N N N N 
2200 Unirapid 2010    N N N N 
2681 Viridis3D 2015    N N N N 
1722 Voxeljet 2005  x  N N N N 
1818 Voxeljet 2006  x  N N N N 
1914 Voxeljet 2007  x  N N N N 
2010 Voxeljet 2008  x  N N N N 
2106 Voxeljet 2009  x  N N N N 
2202 Voxeljet 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2298 Voxeljet 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2394 Voxeljet 2012 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2490 Voxeljet 2013 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2586 Voxeljet 2014 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2682 Voxeljet 2015 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1435 Wuhan Binhu 2002    N N N N 
1531 Wuhan Binhu 2003    N N N N 
1627 Wuhan Binhu 2004    N N N N 
1723 Wuhan Binhu 2005    N N N N 
1819 Wuhan Binhu 2006    N N N N 
1915 Wuhan Binhu 2007    N N N N 
2011 Wuhan Binhu 2008    N N N N 
2107 Wuhan Binhu 2009    N N N N 
2203 Wuhan Binhu 2010    N N N N 
2299 Wuhan Binhu 2011    N N N N 
2395 Wuhan Binhu 2012    N N N N 
2491 Wuhan Binhu 2013    N N N N 
2588 Wuhan Huake  2014    N N N N 
2684 Wuhan Huake 2015    N N N N 
2589 Xery 2014    N N N N 
2685 Xery 2015    N N N N 
2590 Xi'an Bright Laser  2014    N N N N 
2686 Xi'an Bright Laser  2015    N N N N 
863 Z Corp. 1996  x  N N N N 
959 Z Corp. 1997  x  N N N N 
1055 Z Corp. 1998  x  N N N N 
1151 Z Corp. 1999  x  N N N N 
1247 Z Corp. 2000 x x  Y Y N N 
1343 Z Corp. 2001 x x  Y Y N N 
1439 Z Corp. 2002 x x  Y Y N N 
1535 Z Corp. 2003 x x  Y Y N N 
Top Management Team Tenure, Competitive Repertoires, and Firm Performance in the 3D Printing Industry (1988 – 2015)  
108 
1631 Z Corp. 2004 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1727 Z Corp. 2005 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1823 Z Corp. 2006 x x x Y Y Y Y 
1919 Z Corp. 2007 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2015 Z Corp. 2008 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2111 Z Corp. 2009 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2207 Z Corp. 2010 x x x Y Y Y Y 
2303 Z Corp. 2011 x x x Y Y Y Y 
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APPENDIX B - Power Analysis 
Prior Study Sample Sizes and Variables 
  Study 
DV Fox 
(2017) 
Ferrier  
(2001) 
Ndofor et al. 
(2011) 
Bridoux et 
al. (2013) 
Rindova et 
al. (2010) 
Miller &  
Chen (1996) 
Nadkarni et 
al. (2015) 
Hambrick et 
al., (1996) 
Derfus et al. 
(2008) 
Perf. 155 224  147 172 262 126 1,186 156 281 
Actions 148 224  239 N/A 262 126 1,186 139 N/A 
 
A Priori and Post-Hoc Power Analysis5,6,7 
 If Sample Size is X% of the Wohler’s report N…  
25% 34% 50% 100%  150% 
N = 111 N = 155 N = 222 N = 444 N = 667 
…and ∆R2 (r) equals… … then Power equals 
R2 = 
0.005  
r = 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.32 0.45 
0.01 0.10 0.18 0.23 0.32 0.56 0.73 
0.02 0.14 0.32 0.42 0.56 0.85 0.95 
0.03 0.17 0.45 0.58 0.74 0.95 0.99 
0.04 0.20 0.56 0.71 0.86 0.99 0.99 
0.05 0.23 0.67 0.81 0.92 0.99 0.99 
 
Representative Study Correlations8 
  Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable  Performance Volume Complexity Consistency 
Volume  .15*, .15^, .22^^, .14^^ , 
.24(MS),  
-.13 (ROA) 
  
N/A 
Complexity   .26*, .21’, 
.13 (MS), 
.13 (ROA)   
.18’’, .35  
Functional Diversity  
(Tenure Diversity) 
 -.10^, -.04, .04, .28 (MS), 
-.06 (ROA) 
.07*, .07^, -
.13**, .38 
.03*, -.02`,  
.36 
Industry Tenure  .10**, -.06**, .13 (MS), 
.27 (ROA) 
.04**,.12``, .08 .23 
*   Ferrier (2001) – performance = MS gain; functional diversity is a composite; complexity = simplicity 
** Hambrick et al. (1996) – performance = market share change, profit change; volume = action propensity 
^  Nadkarni et al. (2015) –  functional diversity is a composite; performance = ROS, ROA  
^^ – Derfus et al. (2008) – performance = ROA, ROS  
‘   Miller and Chen (1996) – complexity = concentration 
‘’  Andrevski et al. (2013) – complexity = action variety 
` Ferrier and Lyon (2004) – complexity = simplicity 
`` Smith et al (1991) = volume = response likelihood; industry tenure = years of experience 
Fox (2017) 
 
                                                 
5 Assumes 30 predictors.  Used G-Power 3.1, linear multiple regression, post hoc setting (power given alpha, sample size, and effect size). 
6 The sample size from the Wohler’s Report information is calculated in Appendix A. 
7 Achieved sample size is indicated in red.. 
8 I have coded also coded repertoire simplicity correlations as complexity. 
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